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SURVIVORS 
For years I've watched 
an old mesquite tree -
gnarled and bent and twisted -
buffeted by winds and droughts. 
It started to grow up 
toward the sun and sky. 
But the soil is so poor, 
the water so scarce, 
the heat so fierce, 
so cold at times, 
it was beat to the ground. 
Each Winter you'd think, 
- it's dead, for sure! 
It's succumbed to the odds 
stacked against it. 
Yet wait 'til the Spring 
and a miracle occurs, 
New life springs up 
from the gnarled old branches -
a tiny chartreuse sprout 
heads straight for the sun! 
It lives - overcoming 
all that is hard, 
telling all the world, 
- I live, I will survive! 
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Sometimes I feel like that old mesquite tree 
I feel battered by life's adversities, 
I feel down - but not out! 
When Spring rolls around, 
I feel a fresh stirring of life. 
I have things to do -
places I want to explore, 
people I love! 
I can hold my head high -
look the world in the eye -
and say, 
- I live, I will survive! 
Maude s. Newton (Caregiver of 
Alzheimer's patient, in 
Gruetzner,1988, p. 142) 
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SUMMARY 
In recent years, the move toward a more holistic perspective 
in health care has led to social scientists investigating 
psychosocial factors in chronic illness, such as the different 
languages used by health professionals when talking about 
nonhealth. However, there has been little inquiry into 
caregivers' illness experiences of stroke and Alzheimer's disease 
(AD). This study therefore explores the illness experiences of 
seven caregivers whose spouses are stroke or AD patients. 
A hermeneutic approach was adopted and two relatively 
unstructured interviews were conducted with each caregiver. 
Using Kleinman's work on illness narratives as an interpretive 
framework, it was found that - except for people questioning the 
authenticity of AD caregivers' experiences - similarities in 
caregivers' experiences outweighed differences. All described 
the extent to which their lives had been damaged by the illness 
and their reparation attempts. Critique of the research is 
presented and the findings' implications for treatment are 
suggested. 
CHAPTER 1 
. 
CONSTRUCTING THE WINDOW 
The Surreptitious Pursuit for Diagnosis 
Eventually I told my house doctor and we £vt him to a 
neurologist and the neurologist said, no, he doesn't see 
any signs of Alzheimer's. He sees a gentleman of 60 odd 
who - (we have a son who, is also not well. He has a drug-
induced schizophrenia and has given us a lot of grief and 
heartache over the years. So, my husband always blamed 
all his problems on the fact that he had all this grief 
with our son). So, he said, "no", the neurologist said, 
"No, there is nothing. I don't see anything, he is just 
deeply stressed about the son and that's that". I thought 
to myself - no - (a) I thought he doesn't want to work and 
(b) I thought my husband has still the ability to cover up 
nicely ... this was his wife who was just imagining ... 
In that period we struggled along ... Then we went to see 
another doctor and then I got clever and I wrote out what 
I had noticed. I wrote it all on a fullscap sheet, all the 
things I had noticed, and I surreptitiously gave it to the 
doctor and he read it and he went to examine my husband and 
he came out and said: "No, there is no doubt what it is, it 
is Alzheimer's and I'm very sorry bye-bye". You know, 
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doctors, I don't know whether you have heard this, 
but the doctors are impossible. They can't do anything 
and they really don't want to. I think they're frightened. 
They know they can't do anything and they feel impotent. 
They feel totally impotent ... So then, I think now and 
then my husband would say: "God, what is the matter with 
me? I can't remember anything!" Then we went back to the 
original doctor; the original doctor who had said there was 
nothing wrong with him . . . and the diagnosis was made. And 
he put him onto all the usual crap that doesn't help one 
little bit and we used to go every three months. He would 
say, "Hello", and he would say to me, "How is he?" - "How 
are you, Mr P?" So, you know, it was just a routine sort 
of thing ... And then, about a year ago, I suddenly noticed 
he can't speak nicely; the words are not coming out. So, 
I spoke to a friend of mine who is a speech therapist and 
I said, "What is, you know, going on?" and she explained 
and she sent us to a very nice young speech therapist. And 
I must tell you that the speech therapist has taken more 
interest in him, has done more for him, has been more 
supportive than any of the neurologists. She's the only 
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one who has really shown - so, then, she asked us to go to 
another neurologist who she said is very speech orientated 
and we went and he is indeed a very dynamic young man. 
But, even he said: "Terribly sorry". He is very 
interested in the speech centre of the brain where he 
can help, but he said there is nothing he can do. 
"But, by all means, if you feel like it, do come back 
and see me". So, we haven't been to see any doctors 
lately. (Cynthia P., caregiver of Alzheimer's patient. 
First interview, 8 July 1992) 
The Vigilant Detective 
I feel that the neuro should have taken notice of what I had 
observed. After all I have lived with him for years and I 
know how he reacts and what he looks like and what he does, 
but he wasn't interested. So, then, once he had what they 
call a stroke, he (the neurologist) said that was the first 
stroke he had had. But, it wasn't! I was at the hospital 
all the time, because I wanted to see what was going on 
after this churlish treatment from the neuro. When I left 
him (her husband) he seemed to be okay. Then the next 
4 
morning early when I 'phoned, I just 'phoned to see how he 
was, and they said, "Oh, he had a good night", and the 
nurse sounded, I don't know, there was something about her 
voice. So, I said, "Well, look, if there is any change I 
want you to 'phone me please". So about five minutes later 
they 'phoned to say would I please come up to the hospital. 
Now, there again I felt there's no communication. Why did 
she tell me he was all right, when she knew damn well he 
wasn't? (Ann z., stroke caregiver. First interview, 5 June 
1992) 
These extracts conjure up images of two women, both 
simultaneously the wives and primary caregivers' of their ill 
husbands, repeatedly attempting to penetrate an invisible 
barrier between their own and the doctors' perspectives about 
their ill husbands in a search to be heard, understood and helped 
by medical professionals. Cynthia P., whose husband is an 
Alzheimer's patient, tried to break down this barrier by 
"surreptitiously" giving the second neurologist a fullscap sheet 
of paper with her observations. Her experience of their 
encounter with the first neurologist was dissatisfying, because 
her husband convincingly conveyed the impression that she was 
"just imagining" that he was ill and that his problems were 
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merely due to the "grief" and "heartache" he had experienced over 
the years with his son's illness. Not only were her observations 
disqualified, but she and her husband had to "struggle along" 
until such time that she became desperate and "got clever" enough 
to devise a plan of getting through this barrier to be heard by 
the doctor. The manner in which she describes their encounters 
with the neurologists reveals a sense of frustration ("the 
doctors are impossible") and despair at both the hopeless 
situation and t~e apparent helplessness experienced by doctors 
("they can't do anything •.. they're frightened ... they feel 
impotent"). She thus reacted to the doctor's post-diagnostic 
treatment attempts with disdain and anger - "put him onto all the 
usual crap that doesn't help one little bit". 
Ann z., the wife of a stroke patient, also describes being 
disqualified by her husband's neurologist ("he wasn't 
interested") and when relating the incident during the 
interview spoke emphati~ally and was indignant about what had 
transpired. She thus felt it was necessary to be present at the 
hospital as much as possible ("I was at the hospital all the 
time, because I wanted to see what was going on") in the hope 
that she might gain some idea about the doctor's perspectives. 
When she was not present at her husband's bedside she would 
telephone the hospital and listen carefully to the changing 
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nuances in the nurse's voice to try and detect any changes in her 
husband's condition. She neither trusted the nursing staff to 
call her if there was a slight change in her husband's condition 
nor to reveal their perspectives on his condition when she 
contacted the hospital. Instead she felt she had to be acutely 
vigilant in an attempt to detect whatever subtle clues as to her 
husband's condition might be present in the doctors' and nurses' 
speech and behaviour. However, Cynthia's strategic approach and 
Ann's undercover detective method did not succeed in removing the 
impervious, invisible barrier between the illness experiences of 
caregivers and the language of disease created by medical 
professionals (Kleinman, 1988b), because even once a diagnosis 
was made by the doctors these women felt disqualified and 
unsupported. Ann explained that she "felt there's no 
communication" and Cynthia reported receiving more support from 
a "very nice young speech therapist" than any of the 
neurologists. 
Neglect of the illness experiences that patients' and their 
caregivers' bring to health professionals, is one outcome of the 
practitioner's adherence to the biomedical model. 
In the practitioner's act of recasting illness as 
disease, something essential to the experience of 
chronic illness is lost; it is not legitimated as a 
subject for clinical concern, nor does it receive an 
intervention ... Hence, at the heart of clinical care 
for the chronically ill - those who cannot be cured 
but must continue to live with illness - there is a 
potential (and in many cases, actual) source 
of conflict. (Kleinman, 1988b, p. 6) 
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In the case of Cynthia and Ann, the conflictual nature of their 
encounters with various doctors is evident in how they narrated 
these encounters. For instance, Ann felt angry about what she 
construed as the nurse's deception - "Why did she tell me he was 
all right, when she knew damn well he wasn't?", and the "churlish 
treatment" she received from her husband's neurologist. These 
experiences served to encourage her insistence that she be heard 
and informed about diagnostic and treatment decisions. 
A metaphor one could use to describe the inaccessible 
nature of health professionals' esoteric language, is that of 
a one-way mirror between them and their patients. The 
professional is able to see the patient through the mirror and 
can make hypotheses based on his observations and what the 
patient says. However, the patient sees only her own reflection 
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and thus gets no meaningful feedback concerning her illness. The 
health professional is therefore at a metalevel to the patient, 
which enables him to select and transform the information given 
by the patient and to make deductions from his external frame of 
reference. The patient, on the other hand, has only limited 
influence over this transformation and is left alone to make 
sense of those experiences not considered by the practitioner. 
This disjunction can have both positive and negative 
consequences. A positive resistance can be induced, which 
strengthens the patient's decision to overcome the illness or, 
on the other hand, it could reduce the patient's receptivity 
to useful medical information. 
The metaphor can be extended to include the experience 
of caregivers. In recent_ years, the demands upon the family 
caregivers of adults with chronic illness have become 
increasingly complex due to the large decrease in mortality from 
acute diseases following advances in surgery. A second 
contributing factor is that economic pressure has led to a number 
of changes in the heal th and social service systems that have put 
additional pressure on family caregivers. In view of these 
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factors, it is clear that caregiving research, which has 
developed along two major streams - the effects of caregiving 
on the caregiver and interventions to address caregiver and 
patient needs - should become a more focal area of research in 
the future. However, Kleinman (1988b) points out that thus far, 
although "there is much to admire and recommend in current 
medical practice, the care of chronic illness is not one of the 
great success stories of contemporary medicine" (preface). 
Underlying this failure in the care of chronic illness, is the 
model of disease that informs the gaze and practice of medical 
practitioners. While this model locates disease deep within the 
body, thereby enabling the diagnosis and treatment of physical 
lesions, it by the same token diverts attention from the domain 
of the social and semantic, thus contributing to the conflictual 
situations described above. 
Since, broadly defined, "a model is nothing more than a 
belief system utilized to explain natural phenomena, to make 
sense of what is puzzling or disturbing" (Engel, 1977, p. 130), 
the belief system utilized by health professionals needs to be 
expanded to a more holistic perspective, which focuses on the 
person in his or her environment and which simultaneously 
incorporates patients' and their caregivers' illness experiences. 
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Engel's ( 19 7 7) proposal of a biopsychosocial model, which offers 
a more holistic perspective, is now making headway in primary 
care, and the distinctions made between the different languages 
used by health professionals and lay people when talking about 
nonhealth have been investigated by social scientists, such as 
Berger (1991), Helman (1987; 1990; 1991), Kleinman (1980; 1986; 
1987; 1988a; 1988b), Rogers (1992), and Rosenman (1978). 
However, early studies concerning the psychosocial factors in 
illness have 
focused on the patient whose distress was both more 
visible and more accessible to research inquiry. 
Thus, studies of the reactions of patients to such 
illnesses as cancer and heart disease were the first 
to emerge from a psychosocial perspective. [It is 
noteworthy that illnesses characterized by cognitive 
and affective disturbances, such as mental illness, 
stroke, and Alzheimer's disease, have had little 
parallel inquiry into patient distress]. (Biegel, 
Sales & Schulz, 1991, p. 24) 
The few studies which have investigated psychosocial response 
patterns to impairment following brain injury (Lezak, 1978, 1986; 
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Prigatano, 1986; Romano, 1974; Sbordone, Kral, Gerard & Katz, 
1984), provide implicit support for the importance of illness 
language by focusing on family members' reactions to the 
characterological alterations of brain injured patients. 
However, these studies simultaneously reduce the significance of 
illness language by re-interpreting it in another framework (such 
as psychodynamic theory). For instance, Romano (1974) observed 
the responses of the families of 13 patients who had experienced 
traumatic head injury and found that family members not only 
reacted to the patient's injury with the initial understandable 
and expected denial, but that this denial persisted. She 
interprets the evidence of marked anger in family members' 
responses as being used in the service of maintaining their 
denial. Thus, family members' complaints that staff were 
maliciously withholding positive information from them is 
considered by Romano to be evidence of denial (Romano, 1974, 
p. 5) • 
The intention is not to invalidate Romano's interpretation, 
but to provide an example of how the generalization of family 
members' responses as evidence of denial masks the different 
experiences, meanings and cultural orientations of these members 
and therefore serves to negate their experiences. Their anger 
towards hospital staff may in fact be a function of this 
disqualification. Therefore, rather than translating illness 
12 
language into another language, it is important to analyse the 
way people talk and the nature of illness language, because this 
would validate patients' and caregivers' 'realities', and thereby 
create opportunities for more effective support and care of those 
faced with illness. 
Mauss-Clum and Ryan (1981) investigated the responses of 
wives and mothers to their family member's head injury due to 
trauma, a vascular accident or Alzheimer's disease {AD), and also 
found that families strongly objected to early pessimistic 
predictions by health professionals. On the basis of this 
observation they conclude that hope is an important support 
during the immediate crisis. In addition, they found that family 
members ranked their need for a clear and kind explanation of the 
patient's condition as first priority, but only half of the 
family members who were interviewed reported receiving an 
explanation of the patient's condition, while 20 percent denied 
receiving any information and counselling. I would thus argue 
that in view of both the negation of family members' experiences 
by health professionals and staff {perpetuated by researchers' 
generalizations), and the tendency of professionals to not 
provide clear explanations of their perspectives on the patient's 
condition, it is understandable that family members' would react 
angrily toward hospital staff members. Describing their angry 
responses as evidence of denial not only negates family members' 
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experiences, but also implies that professionals can do little 
to be heard and understood by family members and vice versa. In 
contrast, describing their anger as a response to 
disqualification implies that it is possible for professionals 
and family members to understand each other and implement 
effective treatment and coping strategies. 
Studies investigating the psychosocial aspects of stroke and 
Alzheimer's disease (AD) have recently begun to emerge, but most 
have focused on the burdensome nature of caregiving (Gilleard, 
Boyde & Watt, 1982; Gwyther & George, 1986; Zarit, Reever & Bach-
Peterson, 1980; Zarit, Todd & Zarit, 1986), whereas others have 
attempted to identify variables involved in the prediction of 
depressive symptoms in caregiving. For example, Boss, Caron, 
Horbal and Mortimer (1990) examined the role of two perceptual 
variables - boundary ambiguity and mastery - in predicting the 
development of depression in caregivers of AD, and concluded that 
the more a caregiver perceives a mate as psychologically absent, 
the less masterful and the more depressed she or he is. Al though 
these two perceptual variables may play a role in predicting the 
development of depressive symptoms in some caregivers of 
cognitively impaired patients, one should be cautious in 
generalizing this finding to all such caregivers since to do so 
implies that they construct and react to the problem in highly 
similar fashion. Rather, it is proposed that the caregiving of 
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chronic illness is a more complex process, with each caregiving 
experience being unique, and which cannot be fully understood by 
identifying specific variables through quantitative analysis. 
Consequently, techniques for the qualitative analysis of 
caregivers' language would appear essential in enabling health 
professionals to gain a more holistic prespective on the 
caregiving experience. Following Good and Good (1980), it is 
therefore argued that 
the most critical and problematic variables seem to be 
the meaning a symptom has for the patient (and 
caregiver) and the idiom or language in which distress 
is experienced and communicated. (p. 173) 
This argument is convergent with that of social constructionist 
approaches to family therapy, which view the reality of a 
problem - be it one of disease or purely behavioural in nature -
as linguistically shaped by those interacting around it, 
including the therapist (Anderson & Goolishian, 1988; Butchart, 
1988; Griffith, Griffith & Slovik, 1990). As a consequence of 
this emphasis on language, the vocabulary of family therapy has 
largely jettisoned cybernetic-systems metaphors in favour of a 
postmodern, anthropological metaphor - that of narrative 
(Hoffman, 1990). In anthropology, cultural constructivists are 
concerned with human experience and how local cultural history, 
context and knowledge construct and shape it (Jenkins, 1991; 
Kleinman, 1988b). Similarly, the core of Kleirunan's 
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(1988b) argument is that illness has meaning and that tu 
understand how illness obtains meaning involves the 
interpretation of illness narratives. Kleirunan's (1988b) 
argument that the interpretation of illness narratives is an 
important task in doctoring, is taken a step further by Anderson 
and Goolishian (1988) who believe that 
therapy is a process of expanding and saying the 
'unsaid' - the development, through dialogue, of new 
themes and narratives, and, actually, the creation of 
new histories ... This resource for change, the not-
yet-said, is not 'in' the unconscious or any other 
psychic structure. This resource is not 'in' the cell 
or the biological structure, nor is it 'in' a social 
structure such as the family. This resource is in the 
'circle of the unexpressed'. This resource, this 
capacity for change, is in the ability we have 'to be 
in language' with each other and, in language, always 
to develop new themes, new narratives, and new 
stories. (p. 381) 
The co-construction and analysis of illness narratives thus 
facilitates an understanding of patients' illness meanings, 
reveals the way cultural values and relations shape these 
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meanings, creates a context for new narratives and meanings to 
emerge, and enables professionals to discover "that aspect of the 
healer's art that is most ancient, most powerful, and most 
existentially rewarding" (Kleinman, 1988b, preface). 
Accordingly, the interpretive framework for this study is 
provided by Kleinman's (1988b) work on the illness experiences 
of those faced with chronic illness. By engaging in meaning-
generating discourse with caregivers whose spouses have had a 
stroke or suffer from AD, it aims to investigate their illness 
experiences so that a more detailed picture of the complex 
caregiving process may be obtained. Following a review of the 
literature on stroke and AD, it presents a conceptual 
investigation of the nature of the relationship between health 
professionals, patients and caregivers (particularly the 
languages of health professionals and caregivers), and a 
qualitative analysis of the illness narratives produced by seven 
caregivers, each of whom was interviewed twice with an interval 
of approximately one year between each interview. Discussion of 
these narratives demonstrates the diversity of culturally 
constructed realities that develop in different professional-
patient interactions, and the final chapter examines the 
implications of this approach for future research and the care 
of stroke and AD sufferers. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EPIDEMIOLOGY, ETIOLOGY AND BIOMEDICAL DESCRIPTIONS OF STROKE 
Stroke: "a clinical syndrome (a collection of 
symptoms and signs) which has been defined ... as 
rapidly developed clinical signs of focal (or global) 
disturbance of cerebral function, lasting more than 24 
hours or leading to death, with no apparent cause 
other than of vascular origin ... Put more simply, it 
is the outward manifestation of a localized sudden 
interruption of the blood supply to some part of the 
brain." (Wade, Langton Hewer, Skilbeck & David, 1985, 
p. 6) 
Stroke is the third leading cause of death in the United 
States after heart disease and cancer (Caplan & Stein, 1986). 
Stroke incidence - the number of new cases occurring in a given 
population over a set period - has been the subject of many 
studies, most of which agree that Western countries all have 
annualised incidence rates of between 150 and 250 per 100 000 
population (Wade et al., 1985). On the other hand, stroke 
prevalence - the number of people who have ever suffered 
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a stroke and who are still alive on a particular day - has been 
less well studied. In most reports, prevalence is estimated from 
known incidence and survival data rather than directly measured 
(Wade et al., 1985). For example, a National Survey of Stroke 
in the USA suggested a prevalence of 794 per 100 000 on 1 July 
1976. 
In South Africa, the South African Medical Research 
Council's (SAMRC, 1987) review of South African mortality 
indicated that in 1984 there was a total of 35 074 recorded 
deaths due to diseases of the circulatory system. This accounted 
for 20,5 percent of all deaths and of those, 34,9 percent 
involved cerebrovascular disease. However, incidence and 
prevalence rates of stroke are not available in South Africa, and 
therefore a comparison with rates in the USA is not possible. 
Nevertheless, the SAMRC found that white and Asian males are at 
substantially higher risk than black and coloured males for death 
due to diseases of the circulatory system. White females are at 
less risk than Asian females for death due to circulatory 
disease, but at greater risk than coloured and black females. 
This pattern - white and Asian males and females at greater 
risk of death due to circulatory disease than black and coloured 
males and females - could be due to differences in lifestyles and 
eating habits, and is likely to change as industrialisation 
proceeds. With the move toward greater industrialisation in 
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South Africa, the incidence of stroke is likely to increase and 
mirror the incidence figures of other industrialized countries, 
such as the USA, putting more pressure on the health system to 
provide care (Yach & Von Schirnding, 1993). 
What is a Stroke? 
'Stroke' is the term commonly used to refer to the most 
frequently encountered of the cerebrovascular diseases - the 
cerebrovascular accident (CVA). This syndrome, involving 
neurological deficit of relatively rapid onset, is produced by 
one of several conditions that impair circulation of blood to 
the brain or spinal cord. Depending on the brain areas involved, 
there are a wide variety of symptoms affecting motor, sensory, 
cognitive, language and other functions. 
Etiology of Strokes 
According to Caplan and Stein (1986), there are two major 
mechanisms of brain damage in stroke patients: ischemia and 
hemorrhage. Detailed pathophysiological explanations of is chemic 
and hemorrhagic strokes are common in the literature on stroke 
(Barnett, 1986; Wade et al., 1985), but despite the fact that 
neuropsychological deficits are amongst the most frequent 
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sequelae (Walsh, 1985), relatively little attention has been 
given to their description. Accordingly, the following 
descriptions and explanations of the pathophysiological and 
neuropsychological aspects of ischemic and hemorrhagic strokes 
are largely derived from Lezak (1983). 
Ischaemia. Ischemia is a pathological process whereby 
healthy brain tissue is deprived of essential nutrients, 
primarily glucose and oxygen, due to a lack of blood flow. 
The disruption of normal blood flow (infarction) creates an area 
of damaged or dead tissue (infarct). Caplan and Stein (1986) 
subdivide ischemic strokes into those that follow from different 
mechanisms, such as thrombosis and embolism. 
Thrombotic strokes occur when there is an obstruction of 
blood flow due to the narrowing or occlusion of a blood vessel 
by clumps of blood particles and tissue overgrowth (a thrombus) , 
which accumulate in arteriosclerotic plaques and build up 
within the artery walls. Arteriosclerotic plaques are the most 
common source of thrombotic obstructions, affecting mainly the 
larger extracranial and intracranial vessels. Growth of the 
thrombus narrows the lumen (opening) of the blood vessel and 
thereby reduces blood flow or closes off the vessel altogether. 
Thrombotic strokes may occur suddenly, but are usually preceded 
by transient ischemic attacks - "little strokes" - which last 
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less than 24 hours by definition (Lezak, 1983). 
An embolic stroke occurs when a plug of thrombic material 
(an embolus) formed elsewhere within the vascular system breaks 
off and lodges in a vessel, thereby blocking the blood flow. 
Most emboli are fragments of thrombotic lesions that developed 
outside the intracranial circulatory system; mainly in the heart 
and blood vessels. Unlike thrombotic strokes, embolic strokes 
occur more suddenly and without warning. 
The effects of ischemic infarctions vary from patient to 
patient depending on a number of different factors, such as 
individual differences in the anatomical organization of the 
cerebral circulation, and variations in the extent, sites and 
severity of arteriosclerotic disease. Age and sex may also play 
a role in determining the presentation of a stroke (Eslinger & 
Damasio, 1981). For example, embolic strokes tend to occur at 
an earlier age than thrombotic strokes and are more likely to 
involve anterior areas of the brain (Lezak, 1983). Consequently, 
each stroke is an individual event. 
Nevertheless, certain overall patterns in onset and 
manifestations can be identified. Strokes generally tend to have 
one-sided effects, lateralizing to the right or to the left. 
During the acute stages, secondary effects of the stroke, such 
as edema (swelling), can cause more serious bilateral or diffuse 
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damage than the stroke itself and may result in death. Thus, 
during the acute stages of the illness, patients often display 
signs of bilateral or diffuse damage, which may diminish and 
dissipate altogether as swelling decreases and other 
physiological disturbances return to a more normal state. 
After the initial acute stages of the illness, most patients who 
experienced ischemic strokes are left with some lateralized 
deficits and relatively minimal evidence of diffuse damage. 
Their focal deficits typically fit into a pattern of dysfunction 
associated with areas of the brain that share a common artery or 
network of smaller arterial vessels (Lezak, 1983). 
Hemorrhage. Hemorrhagic strokes occur when blood is 
released into the extravascular space within the cranium, thereby 
increasing the pressure within it. This increase in pressure 
cuts off connected pathways, which in turn causes localized or 
generalized injury to brain tissue. Caplan and Stein (1986) 
further divide hemorrhagic strokes into two subtypes -
subarachnoid and intra cerebral . In the subarachnoid hemorrhage, 
bleeding usually originates from aneurysms - "weak vessel wall ( s) 
that can balloon out and ultimately burst under pressure" (Lezak, 
1983, p. 178) - or arteriovenous malformations. Blood leaks out 
of the vascular bed on the brain's surface and spreads into the 
spaces around the brain by means of the spinal fluid pathways. 
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Bleeding due to a ruptured aneurysm is usually faster and at a 
greater pressure than bleeding due to other causes, such as 
trauma and suddenly increasing intracranial pressure. The 
patient may or may not lose consciousness, depending on the 
severity of the bleed, but the condition can be fatal when 
massive bleeding occurs. However, if the bleeding is arrested 
soon enough, relatively little brain damage may result. 
In those cases where the damage is extensive but not fatal, 
patients tend to display behavioural impairments attributable to 
focal damage (Lezak, 1983). However, the neuropsychological 
deficits resulting from ischemic strc ~s are likely to be more 
widespread than those resulting from ruptured aneurysms, because 
when an aneurysm ruptures the flow of blood into the 
extravascular space within the skull is liable to affect a larger 
area of the brain than the more localized blockage of a blood 
vessel due to ischemic infarctions. Warning signs rarely precede 
these hemorrhagic strokes. The manifestations of ruptured 
aneurysms range from painful headaches, often accompanied by 
nausea, to severe neurological dysfunction and even death. 
Strokes due to intracerebral hemorrhage most of ten occur in 
conjunction with hypertension (high blood pressure). Unlike the 
type of bleeding which occurs in subarachnoid hemorrhages, the 
blood flows directly into the brain substance and the degree of 
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damage depends on the location, rapidity, volume, and pressure 
of the bleeding (Caplan & Stein, 1986). The area usually 
affected by intracerebral hemorrhages is the subcortical area of 
the cortex (the thalamus, basal ganglia and brain stem). 
Consequently, these intracerebral hemorrhages have a mortality 
rate of around 50 percent, and the condition of those who 
survive such strokes can vary from near-vegetative to 
relatively good return to independence. Neuropsychological 
deficits evident amongst those who show improvement include 
attention and memory problems, irritability, and some subtle 
changes in psychosocial and self-regulatory behaviour, typically 
associated with frontal lobe lesions (Walton, 1977). 
The description of these five major subtypes of stroke is 
important, because it reflects the heterogenous nature of strokes 
and facilitates accurate diagnosis and effective medical 
treatment. The problems presented by these major subtypes of 
stroke are quite distinct and require different treatment 
strategies (Caplan & Stein, 1986). For example, in subarachnoid 
hemorrhage, treatment is aimed at preventing the next aneurysmal 
leak, whereas in intracerebral hemorrhage rebleeding is rare and 
treatment is aimed at controlling local bleeding and pressure. 
Since modern treatment approaches are constantly improving, 
stroke mortality rates have been declining steadily in recent 
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years in the United States as well as in other industrialized 
nations (Garraway, Whisnant & Drury, 1983). The implication 
of this decline is that a higher order problem has evolved: 
there is an increase in the number of disabled stroke survivors 
and caregivers - all requiring support and assistance. 
In South Africa, the Stroke Aid Society was formed in 
response to the need for support of stroke victims and their 
caregivers. However, is it reasonable to expect this society to 
be solely responsible for responding to the needs of the 
caregiver? What role do medical practitioners and clinical 
psychologists, in particular, play at present in providing 
support to both patients and caregivers and how could their 
contribution be improved? This study aims to address these 
issues. 
CHAPTER 3 
EPIDEMIOLOGY, ETIOLOGY AND BIOMEDICAL DESCRIPTIONS 
OF ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE 
Alzheimer's disease: "a progressive reduction in the 
ability to think, remember, learn and reason, leading 
to a reduced capacity for self-care and self-
direction." (Woods, 1989, p. 7) 
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Alzheimer's disease (AD) is the most common of a family of 
debilitating, dreaded conditions known collectively as the 
'dementias'. There are various interpretations of the term 
'dementia' and here the term is understood to refer to 
the "global deterioration of mental functions due to organic 
diseases of the cerebral hemispheres .•• which have a chronic and 
irreversible course" (Golper & Binder, 1981, in Lezak, 1983, p. 
180). Thus, all of the degenerative disorders in which there is 
progressive deterioration of brain tissue qualify as 'dementias', 
with AIDS perhaps being the most prominent of the degenerative 
disorders at present. 
Alzheimer's disease has a profound impact on all who suffer 
from it, as it insidiously deprives individuals of their unique 
thought processes, their insights, judgement and their ability 
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to learn new information. In its Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (APA, 1987, p. 107), the American 
Psychiatric Association identifies the following clinical 
symptoms as evidence of dementia: impairment in short-term 
memory (inability to learn new information) and long-term memory 
(inability to remember information that was known in the past), 
and evidence of at least one of the following symptoms -
impairment in abstract thinking; impaired judgement; disturbances 
of higher cortical function, such as aphasia (disorders of 
language) , apraxia (inability to execute motor functions despite 
intact comprehension and motor function), agnosia (failure to 
recognise or identify objects despite intact sensory function), 
constructional difficulty (such as the inability to copy three-
dimensional figures) , and personality change (in othe.r words an 
alteration or accentuation of premorbid traits). 
Epidemiology 
Alzheimer's disease affects more than 2, 5 million Americans 
and is the fourth leading cause of death in the USA, causing 
150,000 deaths annually (Rosin, 1987). In the UK it is 
estimated that 750,000 people suffer from AD and its related 
conditions (Woods, 1989). In South Africa, incidence and 
prevalence rates of Alzheimer's disease are not available, and 
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therefore such studies should be conducted in the future. 
Jorrn, Korten and Henderson (1987) have provided a 
quantitative integration of the literature on the prevalence of 
dementia in Japan, Russia, Scandinavia, Britain and the USA. 
Their analysis of dementia prevalence studies showed no overall 
sex differences, but when studies of specific dementing diseases 
(such as AD) were analyzed they found that prevalence rates for 
AD tended to be higher among women than men in these countries 
(Birkett, 1972; Nishihara & Ishii, 1986). This may be because 
women tend to live longer than men and therefore are more prone 
to die with any age-related disease. However, unlike prevalence 
studies, incidence studies concerning sex differences in AD yield 
rather inconsistent results. Some studies show a higher 
incidence of AD amongst women (Akesson, 1969; Molsa, Marttila & 
Rinne, 1982) while others show no difference in incidence rates 
of AD amongst men and women (Schoenberg, Kokmen & Okazaki, 1987). 
According to Jorrn (1990), these inconsistencies are perhaps 
related to differences in case ascertainment procedures, 
and the more consistent sex differences found in prevalence 
studies may reflect survival differences. In other words, there 
may be no sex differences regarding the incidence of AD, but 
women with AD may survive longer than men affected by this 
illness, resulting in higher prevalence rates of AD in women than 
in men. 
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If one accepts the general finding of higher prevalence 
rates of AD amongst women than men, one may be tempted to assume 
that more husbands than wives are caregivers. However, because 
women tend to live longer than men, it is more likely that women 
with AD are cared for by their children or by staff in homes for 
the aged, whereas men with AD are more likely to be cared for by 
their wives. 
Phases of Alzheimer's Disease 
Reisberg (1981) has divided the progression of AD into five 
phases. Knowledge of these stages helps determine the rate at 
which the illness is developing and facilitates the 
identification of symptoms and the tracking of their progression 
as the illness develops. 
Stage 1: Early Confusional Phase. During the initial 
stages of AD, the patient may seem merely forgetful, and may 
also start finding it difficult to deal with sudden changes in 
her environment. Finding the right words to communicate 
becomes a problem and difficulty recalling recent events is 
evident. The AD patient will also begin to lose her 
spontaneity and sparkle and is often easily upset as a result 
of the uncertainties created by memory problems. 
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Stage 2: Late Confusional Phase. During this stage, memory 
problems become more evident and pervasive. The AD patient's 
orientation to time, place and person may still be intact and 
memories of the distant past appear unaffected. However, as 
patients see their capabilities disappearing, they are likely to 
become more focused on themselves and insensitive to the feelings 
of others. At this stage the AD sufferer may still be denying 
she has problems and may see any assistance as interference. 
Stage 3: Early Dementia. At this point in the course of the 
illness, the patient has become quite dependent on others for 
her care, her memory deteriorates further, and a heightened sense 
of insecurity can develop into suspicion and paranoia. This may 
be accompanied by anger when others attempt to disprove her 
accusations as unfounded, and agitated behaviour may develop. 
Alzheimer's victims can be expected to withdraw from social and 
task-oriented activities during this stage. 
Stage 4: Middle Dementia. As AD progresses from early to 
middle dementia, major changes occur and the involvement of 
caregivers increases. Delusions reflecting fear of loss and 
imagined threats in the external world are prominent and the 
patient's sleep is often disrupted and erratic. Impulsive 
symptoms may also develop during this stage, and help with daily 
activities is essential. A fear of bathing and lack of awareness 
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of their surroundings also characterize the behaviour of 
sufferers during this phase of the disease. The emotional 
burdens of caregiving start to take their toll at this point and 
caregivers may consider placing the patient in an institution, 
while simultaneously making greater use of support groups, where 
these exist. 
Stage 5: Late Dementia. During the final phase of AD, 
treatment decisions have to be made without the approval of the 
sufferer. Motor abilities continue to deteriorate and eventually 
the control of bladder and colon functions is lost. The ability 
to chew and swallow food is affected and as brain activity 
becomes disturbed, the patient is increasingly vulnerable to 
seizures, pneumonia, infection and other illnesses. Stupor 
occurs in the terminal stages and leads finally to coma and 
death. 
Etiology 
Since 1907 when Alios Alzheimer, a German neurologist, 
described the changes in the brain of a 51-year old woman who 
died after a four and a half year loss of ability, research into 
AD has produced several schools of thought about possible 
causes. 
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Recent studies concerning the causative and contributing 
factors in the development of AD suggest that people who have 
sustained head trauma may be at greater risk for AD (Clinton, 
Ambler & Roberts, 1991; Mortimer, French, Hutton & Schuman 1985; 
Mortimer et al, 1991). Thus, in South Africa where the annual 
incidence of traumatic brain injury (TBI) in Johannesburg was 
found by Nell and Brown (1991) to be considerably higher than the 
annual incidence of TBI in the United States (316 and 200 per 100 
000 population respectively), one might expect incidence and 
prevalence rates of AD to be higher than those in the USA. If 
this is the case, both TBI and AD could be described as 'silent 
epidemics' in South Africa. However, further research is 
necessary to determine the extent to which prior head trauma 
plays a role in the development of AD. 
Until recently, a positive diagnosis of AD could only be 
established post-mortem when senile plaques containing a central 
core consisting of amyloid surrounded by abnormal neurites were 
found on autopsy. Although senile plaques have also been 
observed in the brains of the elderly in general, there is a 
significantly greater number of these plaques in the brain of the 
AD sufferer. However, the introduction of computerized axial 
tomography (CAT), positron emission topography (PET) and 
electroencephalograph (EEG) scans have now made it possible to 
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establish the extent of brain atrophy in the living, a prominent 
feature in AD and the other dementias. 
Although technological progress has facilitated the 
diagnosis of AD in the living, accurate diagnosis is still 
difficult because scans are not sensitive enough to detect 
evidence of brain atrophy during the initial stages of a 
dementing process and there is a lack of diagnostic criteria to 
discriminate AD from other dementing disorders. However, 
psychological testing has aided the diagnosis of AD, and a number 
of instruments have been devised to provide global measures of 
personal and social functioning. For example, Cummings and 
Benson (1986) have devised the DAT (Dementia of the Alzheimer 
Type) Inventory in order to improve diagnostic accuracy and 
identify operational criteria to distinguish it from other 
dementias. 
Nevertheless, at this time there is no definitive medical 
or psychological test that can diagnose AD. Therefore, other 
potential causes of dementia, such as toxic conditions, 
infections, nutritional and endocrine disorders, slow-growing 
tumours, depression and metabolic disturbances need to to ruled 
out before a diagnosis of AD can be made. Unlike AD which is 
irreversible and progressive, many dementias due to the above 
conditions can be reversed if identified and given early 
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treatment. Thus, although the causes of some dementias can 
be determined, the etiology of AD remains uncertain, as reflected 
in the diversity of theories that attempt to explain it. 
Viral theory. This theory holds that AD is caused by a 
slow, infectious virus that may take several decades to incubate. 
In order to prove that such a virus for AD exists, clinical 
studies would have to show that the disease can be transmitted, 
but thus far attempts to transmit the disease from brain tissue 
to animals have failed. This failure could be due to the animals 
not being susceptible to the disease or because the incubation 
period for the disease is longer than the duration of the studies 
(Prusiner, 1984). Thus, although other neurological disorders 
(such as Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease) have been found to be caused 
by such viruses, there is no evidence of a viral cause in AD at 
present. 
Immune-system theory. Research has found that the number 
of autoimmune antibodies in the blood increases with age and that 
the elderly tend to get more autoimmune diseases, such as cancer 
and late-onset diabetes (Nandy, 1983). Consequently, such age-
related factors suggest that deterioration of the immune system 
may also be implicated in AD. Another possible cause is a 
disorder in the body's immune system, causing the body to attack 
itself, while other indicators suggest non age-related immune 
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system abnormalities. For example, other neurological diseases, 
such as multiple sclerosis and AIDS, are known to involve immune-
system alterations and several studies report findings of marked 
immune-system irregularities in Alzheimer's patients ( Gruetzner, 
1988). However, far more research is needed to fully evaluate 
this theory. 
Aluminium theory. The concentration of aluminium in the 
human brain is known to increase with age (Jenike, 1985), and 
abnormally high levels of aluminium have been found in the brains 
of persons suffering from other dementias, al though these may be 
unrelated to the disease. These indications suggest that high 
levels of aluminium may possibly be related to AD, but there is 
no proof of it being a causative factor. 
Genetic theory. Research has determined that genetic 
factors do play a role in AD, but thus far AD has not been widely 
shown to correspond to known patterns of inheritance. Jorm 
(1990) points out that although it seems there may be some 
genetic predisposition toward AD, both a genetic factor and other 
factors must be involved in the development of the disease. The 
part played by genetic factors in other disorders, such as Down's 
syndrome, which shares several features in common with AD, has 
been investigated. However, although there appears to be a 
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possible genetic link to AD, further genetic research needs to 
be conducted. 
Ageing and environment interaction theory. Calne, Eisen, 
McGeer and Spencer (1986) have proposed that environmental 
exposures (including trauma, toxins and infectious agents) can 
cause loss of neurones in specific areas of the central nervous 
system which do not have clinically significant effects at the 
time, but compound with the normal loss of neurones which occurs 
with ageing to produce neurological disorders, such as 
Parkinson's disease and AD, in later life. This theory does not 
specify a single environmental cause for the initial neuronal 
loss, but allows for multiple possibilities. More research is 
therefore needed to investigate the extent to which these various 
factors contribute to the development of AD. Howeve.r, even once 
the role played by these factors is clarified, this theory is 
limited, because genetically-mediated effects are not considered. 
The five theories of AD presented here are not mutually 
exclusive. Several of the mechanisms they postulate could 
operate simultaneously and it is not difficult to sketch 
an overarching theory incorporating elements of them all. 
However, the broad overarching theory sketched by Jorm (1990) is 
"unfortunately rather jelly-like in its ability to be moulded to 
fit any new fact" (Jorm, 1990, p. 170). 
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This brief discussion of the etiology of AD reveals that 
considerable research needs to be conducted regarding its 
etiology and development, with a view to its prevention. The 
financial implications of such extensive, thorough research 
are obvious. In fact, the amount of money spent on research has 
been minute when one compares it with the costs of community 
support services, hospital treatment, and residential provision 
of care (Woods, 1989). In Canada, with around 300,000 
sufferers, it is estimated that the cost runs up to 1,5 billion 
dollars and in the USA, with around 2,5 million sufferers the 
expenditure is more than 50 billion dollars (Woods, 1989). In 
South Africa, where problems such as tuberculosis and high infant 
mortality - created by Apartheid's legacy of selective 
impoverishment - are prominent, Alzheimer's disease constitutes 
a problem of relatively minor importance. Consequently, less 
time and funds are allocated to the care of the Alzheimer 
patient. Thus, family members are usually the only source of 
care and support for these sufferers, and consequently have a 
difficult, painful task to carry out alone. 
The aim of this review has been to provide a broad overview 
of the disease as an object of biomedical knowledge. From this 
it is apparent that while the origins of AD remain somewhat of 
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a mystery to researchers, medical professionals could 
nevertheless provide caregivers with information about AD and 
thereby prepare the families of AD patients for the future. 
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CHAPTER 4 
LANGUAGE, TIME, CULTURE: THE ILLNESS-DISEASE DICHOTOMY 
Language 
The central role played by language in constructing and 
communicating social and individual reality is acknowledged by 
various authors, such as Good and Good (1980), and Gadamer 
(1976): 
There is no societal reality, with all its concrete 
forces, that does not bring itself to representation 
in a consciousness that is linguistically articulated. 
Reality does not happen "behind the back" of language; 
it happens rather behind the backs of those who live 
in the subjective opinion that they have understood 
"the world" ... ; that is, reality happens precisely 
within language. (Gadamer, 1976, p. 35) 
From this perspective, the preceding chapters on the epidemiology 
and etiology of stroke and Alzheimer's disease not only clarify 
the nature, course and possible causes of these chronic 
illnesses, but also exemplify the dominant language of disease 
inherent in the literature. Highly technical medical terminology 
- such as diagnosis, etiology, ischemia, thrombosis, aphasia, 
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apraxia and agnosia - is central to this language of biomedicine, 
the chief purpose of such terms being to aid the medical 
practitioner in identifying the disease causing the symptoms 
so that once a diagnosis is made, treatment can be implemented. 
However, this world of lesions, apraxias and agnosias is 
a world of clinical certainty and concrete precision distant from 
the uncertain world of irritability, emotional ambiguity and 
confusion inhabited by caregivers and patients. It is in an 
attempt to clarify the quality of these different worlds that 
Kleinman (1988b) distinguishes between 'disease' and 'illness'; 
the former being the object created by biomedical terminology 
toward which treatment is directed, and the latter the experience 
of patients and caregivers. 
By invoking the term illness, I mean to conjure up the 
innately human experience of symptoms and suffering. 
Illness refers to how the sick person and the members 
of the family or wider social network perceive, live 
with, and respond to symptoms and disability. 
(Kleinman, 1988b, p. 3) 
Flowing from this are the additional categories of 'illness 
behaviour', 'illness complaints', 'illness problems' and 'illness 
experience' (Kleinman, 1988b). Illness behaviour refers to the 
patient's initiation of treatment (for example, changing 
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diet and activities) or the decision to seek care from health 
professionals. Once patients and their families decide to seek 
care from professionals, illness complaints are shared with them. 
These complaints could include both the presentation of symptoms 
that the patient is experiencing (such as difficulty in focusing 
on one's work due to headaches, which may lead to feelings of 
frustration and anxiety) and the description of illness problems 
(the principal difficulties that symptoms and disability create 
in our lives). Thus, 'illness experience' designates the 
categorization and explanation of symptoms causing distress in 
common-sense ways accessible to those who comprise the social 
group to which the patient belongs. 
However, because the language of disease constructs objects 
rather than experience, it devalues the significance of such 
meaning, and the illness complaints of the patient are translated 
into signs of disease - "diagnosis is a thoroughly semiotic 
activity: an analysis of one symbol system followed by its 
translation into another" (Kleinman, 1988b, p. 16). This other 
symbolic system - the language of disease - is therefore created 
by the clinician. Although locally shared idioms - such as 
'stress' - may initially create a common ground for the patient 
and clinician to understand each other, these can rapidly become 
a barrier to further understanding, as in the following example 
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of Cynthia P., the wife of an AD patient. On consulting a 
neurologist about her husband's condition, the neurologist said, 
· "No, there is nothing. I don't see anything, he is just deeply 
stressed about the son and that's that". This deduction made by 
the neurosurgeon exemplifies Kleinman's (1988b) statement that 
"clinicians sleuth for pathognomonic signs - the observable, 
telltale clues to secret pathology - that establish a specific 
disease" (Kleinman, 1988b, p. 16). When they do not find these 
signs in the shape of tangible evidence for disease, their 
explanatory models break down and they fall back upon vague 
constructs, such as 'stress', to explain the problem. Cynthia 
was dissatisfied with this attribution of her husband's behaviour 
to the stress consequent on their son's "drug-induced 
schizophrenia", because based on a number of incidents she had 
experienced with her husband over a period of time, she believed 
that he was ill and not merely suffering from stress: 
I remember we went to Cape Town for some reason again. We 
went into the synagogue, we came out and I saw he had 
left the car door open. The next night we went 
somewhere for supper. When we got out the car 
wouldn't start; he had left the car lights on. That 
in itself is not so terrible if (all of us do it), but 
he was doing it often. Like I'd notice (he was a very 
astute and very good businessman; he looked after his 
business and his clients extremely well) and I'd 
notice that he would forget to do a job. Somebody 
would phone and say, "Where are you, you were coming 
to give me a quote" or "What happened? My job was -" 
And then I had, then started the three or four most 
horrible years of my life, because I could see he was 
forgetting everything. (First interview, 8 July 1992) 
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These experiences were not elicited by the neurologist, and as 
Kleinman (1988b) points out, clinicians may even construe such 
illness experiences as obscuring the traces of morbid 
physiological change, whereas for the caregiver of the 
chronically ill it is the very stuff of care; "a symbol that 
stands for itself" (Wagner, 1986, in Kleinman, 1988b, p. 17). 
Should the clinician's explanation of the illness (the diagnosis) 
and the treatment thereof fit with the patient's understanding, 
the patient may incorporate the clinician's explanations into his 
belief system. However, if the clinician's diagnosis does not 
fit with the patient's belief system, a situation develops where 
the patient becomes a problem patient, who in turn reciprocally 
experiences care as a problem in the health care system. Thus, 
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the devaluation of meaning and the overvaluation of the technical 
quest for the control of symptoms, "is a serious failing of 
modern medicine: it disables the healer and disempowers the 
chronically ill" (Kleinman, 1988b, p. 9). 
Meaning and Narrative Discourse 
In recent years, introduction into the social sciences of 
postmodern ideas originating from semiotics and literary 
criticism has led increasingly to thinking about social fields 
of study as if they were a narrative or a text (Hoffman, 1991). 
Consequently, a branch of textual interpretation - hermeneutics -
has been revived by various social scientists (Anderson & 
Goolishian, 1988; Good & Good, 1980). The hermeneutic approach 
to studying social reality posits that the process of translating 
across diverse sets of meanings is analagous to textual 
interpretation: 
Interpretation, in the sense relevant to hermeneutics, 
is an attempt to make clear, to make sense of ... a 
text, or a text analogue, which in some ways is 
confused, incomplete, cloudy, seemingly contradictory 
- in one way or another unclear. The inter~retation 
aims to bring to light an underlying coherence or 
sense. This means that any science which can be 
called 'hermeneutical' even in an extended sense, must 
be dealing with one or another of the confusingly 
interrelated forms of meaning. (Rabinow & Sullivan, 
1979, p. 25) 
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Family therapists who adopt a hermeneutic approach, such as 
Anderson and Goolishian (1988), replace the feedback loops of 
cybernetic systems with the intersubjective loops of dialogue. 
Analysis of Anderson and Goolishian's (1988) work and the ideas 
of social constructionists (Gergen, 1985) reveals the manner in 
which many adherents of postmodernism are dismantling the 
philosophical foundations of Western thought. Rather than taking 
either the idealist position (the view that knowledge derives 
from internal constructs) or the positivist position (the view 
that knowledge is a representation of facts and events in a 
'real' world), social constructionists believe that all knowledge 
evolves in the space between people: 
Social constructionism views discourse about the world 
not as a reflection or map of the world, but as an 
artifact of communal interchange. (Gergen, 1985, p. 
266) 
Gergen (1985) argues that self-narratives are socially produced 
and are neither reflections of 'reality' nor representations of 
the person's 'true' personality traits, beliefs and behaviour. 
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Therefore, based on the social constructionist idea that self-
narratives are socially produced, the illness language of 
caregivers' narratives suggests a complex of ideas and actions 
generated in interactions with others. Thus, the evolving set 
of meanings which emerge from these interactions are not skull-
bound and do not exist inside what we think of as an individual 
'mind', but are part of a general flow of constantly changing 
narratives (Hoffman, 1990). 
In Chapter One, it was pointed out that within the field of 
family therapy there has been a departure from cybernetic-systems 
metaphors, which compare a family to an organism or machine 
(Bateson, 1971; Maturana & Varela, 1980, 1987). Due to this 
departure, hydraulic metaphors like 'homeostasis' (Jackson, 
1957), which are used to explain how entities remain the same, 
and machine terms like 'cybernetics' (Bateson, 1971), 'structural 
coupling' (Maturana & Varela, 1980) and 'autopoiesis' (Maturana 
& Varela, 1980), have been replaced by linguistic constructs like 
'text', 'narrative' and 'history'. These linguistic terms are 
more appropriate than biological and machine metaphors because, 
firstly, therapy is an art of conversation (and therefore terms 
like "text" and "narrative" are "closer to home"), and secondly, 
terms like "history" and "narrative" imply that entities are 
always in the process of change (Hoffman, 1990). Furthermore, 
because these terms are accessible in that their meanings are 
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self-evident, they can be utilized by health professionals from 
various disciplines in different contexts, thereby enabling 
establishment of a common language between these professionals. 
According to Kleinman (1988b), the illness narrative 
'a story the patient tells and significant others retell, to give 
coherence to the distinctive events and long-term course of 
suffering" (Kleinman, 1988b, p. 49) - informs health 
professionals about how life problems are created, controlled and 
made meaningful, and contributes to the experience of symptoms 
and suffering by shaping the experience further, such that new 
experiences evolve during the narrative process. The 
interpretation of illness narratives in the light of different 
modes of illness meanings is imperative, because in the course 
of chronic illness patients, caregivers and health professionals 
become increasingly aware that these meanings can amplify or 
dampen symptoms, exaggerate or lessen disability and impede or 
facilitate treatment (Kleinman, 1988b). 
Illness meanings. Kleinman (1988b) delineates four 
different modes of illness meaning - symptom, cultural 
significance, life world, explanation and emotion - which can be 
identified in patients' and caregivers' illness narratives. 
Symptom as meaning refers to the conventional signification of 
the symptom. For example, palpitations signify distress and 
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paralysis might mean that a person has suffered a stroke. The 
meanings of symptoms are standardized 'truths' in a local 
cultural system in that the categories a group fabricates are 
then projected onto the world and called natural, because they 
are 'found' there. The second mode of illness meaning - cultural 
significance - refers to the fact that certain symptoms and 
disorders bring particularly powerful cultural significance with 
them, often of a stigmatizing kind. Cultural meanings related 
to certain illnesses, such as AIDS, brand the sick person with 
a significance which is often neither easily warded off nor coped 
with by the patient. Consequently, these meanings present 
problems to the patient, caregivers and health professionals 
which are as difficult as the disease itself. 
In the context of chronic illness, the illness absorbs 
personal, interpersonal and social significance from the 
patient's life world. These different meanings are integrated 
into daily living and influence the way in which the patient 
copes with the illness and how caregivers and significant others 
behave toward the patient. 
During the course of the illness, patients, caregivers and 
health professionals also attempt to create acceptable 
explanations of the various aspects of the illness and its 
treatment. Thus, the patient and anyone in the social network, 
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the media, or the orthodox and alternative therapeutic systems, 
construct explanatory accounts in response to a number of 
different questions, such as - What does the illness do to my 
body? What course can I expect the illness to follow in the 
future? These explanatory models (EMs) - the conception about 
illness and treatment held by patients, caregivers and 
practitioners - vary in degree of sophistication, coherence, 
clarity and explanatory power. The influence of basic social and 
cultural determinants can be detected in how EMs may cluster 
according to class, education, occupation, etcetera. These 
determinants are also likely to influence how illness is defined, 
what personal and family meaning it has, what decisions are made 
regarding treatment, and how treatment is evaluated. Thus, the 
illness behaviour of patients and the behaviour of caregivers and 
health professionals are often a direct outgrowth of these 
beliefs (Manschreck & Kleinman, 1977). Health care relationships 
(e.g. patient-practitioner or caregiver-practitioner 
relationships) can be studied as transactions between different 
EMs, and evidence suggests that when professionals elicit, 
analyze and negotiate with patient and caregiver EMs, problems 
in clinical communication are reduced and care is facilitated 
(Lazare, 1974). 
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Thus, should the clinician wish to treat patients effectively, 
patients' illness experiences need to be legitimated by the 
clinician. In other words, the clinician needs to authorize that 
experience and "audit" it empathically (Kleinman, 1988b). 
As a second step in developing a framework by which to 
legitimate.the reality of illness while simultaneously 
acknowledging that of disease, it is useful to consider Rolland's 
(1984) psychosocial typology of chronic illness. Instead of 
constructing diseases as objects, this typology characterizes 
them as dynamic processes distinguished from one another in terms 
of their impact upon social time and space. Rolland (1984) 
construes chronic illness in terms of four dimensions - onset, 
course, outcome and degree of incapacitation. Each of these 
dimensions are now discussed with reference to stroke and AD, 
because it is hypothesized that differences between these 
illnesses in terms of onset, course, outcome and degree of 
incapacitation are likely to influence the experiences of 
caregivers in different ways. 
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The Illness Dimensions 
Onset. The first difference between stroke and AD pertains 
to the onset of these illnesses. Stroke has a sudden, acute 
onset, whereas AD develops gradually. Consequently, the gradual 
development of AD constitutes a different form of stressor to 
caregivers than the sudden occurrence of a stroke. 
Although the total amount of readjustment to family 
structure, roles, problem solving and affective coping might be 
the same for both illnesses, the acute onset of stroke requires 
that these changes be executed more rapidly. Some families are 
able to mobilize crisis management skills more readily than 
others. Families faced with AD, on the other hand, have a more 
protracted period of adjustment, although the confusion 
experienced concerning the symptoms of AD can be a source of 
anxiety, conflict and despair. 
Course. The course of chronic illness can take one of three 
forms - progressive, constant, or episodic. AD is a progressive 
disease of increasing severity. Thus, periods of relief from the 
demands of the illness are minimal and continual adaptation and 
role change is necessary. Stroke follows a constant course, 
because biological changes typically stabilize after the 
initial event, and the chronic phase is usually characterized by 
some clear cut deficit, such as paraplegia, speech loss or 
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cognitive impairment. Although recurrences may occur, caregivers 
are faced with a semi-permanent change that is stable over a 
considerable time span. As in the case of AD, the potential for 
family exhaustion exists in stroke cases, but without the 
constant need for role changes over time evident in families 
dealing with AD. 
Outcome. A critical distinguishing feature is the extent 
to which chronic illness is a likely cause of death and the 
degree to which it can shorten one's life span. At the one 
extreme are illnesses, such as AIDS, which are in most cases 
progressive and fatal, while an intermediate and more 
unpredictable category includes illnesses which shorten the life 
span (such as AD), and those where there is the possibility of 
recurrence, such as stroke. Although all chronic illnesses 
potentially involve the loss of bodily control, one's identity, 
and intimate relationships, for a life-threatening illness the 
loss of control entails greater consequences - death and the 
permanent loss of relationships. For caregivers faced with the 
possible recurrence of stroke, the "it could happen" nature of 
the problem fosters an unpredictable context which may lead to 
caregivers being over-protective toward the patient. In the case 
of AD, the patient and family members are confronted with the 
knowledge that the patient will gradually become more dependent 
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and ultimately no longer able to communicate with or recognize 
family members. Unlike the undercurrent of anticipatory grief 
permeating the experiences of families affected by stroke, for 
those affected by AD the grieving process begins once the family 
members have accepted the diagnosis. In fact, an initial period 
of denial serves to protect those dealing with AD from accepting 
the imminent loss of the patient and from grieving for this loss. 
Therefore, families gradually become caught between a desire for 
intimacy and a pull to "let go" emotionally of the ill member. 
Incapacitation. The fourth category of Rolland's (1984) 
psychosocial typology of chronic illness is incapacitation. 
This refers to the impact of illness upon the social space and 
mobility of the patient and caregivers. Incapacitation can 
result from the impairment of cognition (eg AD), sensation (eg 
blindness), movement (eg stroke with paralysis), energy 
production and disfigurement and other medical causes of social 
stigma. These different kinds of incapacitation imply sharp 
differences in the specific adjustments required of a family. 
In the case of stroke, incapacitation is often worse at the time 
of onset, magnifying family coping issues related to onset, 
expected course and outcome. In the case of AD, however, 
incapacitation is initially less evident and is merely 
anticipated in the intial stages of the illness, thereby allowing 
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the family more time to prepare both emotionally and practically 
for this anticipated incapacitation. Rolland (1988) points out 
that the net effect of incapacitation on a particular patient and 
his family depends on the interaction of the type of 
incapacitation with the pre-illness role demands of the ill 
member and the family's structure and flexibility. 
The extent to which chronic illnesses are predictable was 
not formulated as a separate category in Rolland's (1984) 
typology, because he argues that it is a product of interaction 
between the different dimensions of illness and therefore unique 
to every case (Rolland, 1988, p. 152). The predictability of a 
chronic illness is shaped by two main factors (Rolland, 1988). 
Firstly, the actual nature of the onset, course, outcome or 
presence of incapactitation, of a chronic illness is uncertain. 
For example, the manifestation of a stroke will depend not only 
on the type of stroke, but also on a number of other factors such 
as the particular brain region affected by the stroke, age, sex 
and state of health of the patient. Therefore, although common 
patterns might be expected in certain types of strokes (whether 
they be thrombotic, embolic or hemorrhagic) other factors 
influence the nature of the onset, course and presence or absence 
of i~.capacitation, making each stroke an individual event. The 
unpredictable course and outcome of stroke can therefore 
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complicate long-term planning. Secondly, diseases can vary as 
to the rate at which changes occur. Although AD has a more 
predictable course and outcome than stroke, the rate of 
progression of AD varies in different cases. Long-term planning 
is thus possible, but a more gradual rate of development of the 
disease may require that caregivers have more stamina. However, 
a stepwise progression of AD may provide some periods of relief 
since there may be less need for continual adaptation and role 
changes. 
Illness Time Phases 
Each of the four illness dimensions correspond with a 
particular temporal phase of chronic disease. These time phases 
- crisis, chronic and terminal - aid in providing a context for 
the integration of various aspects of· the assessment and 
encourage clinicians to think longitudinally and to understand 
chronic illness as an ongoing process. They also enable health 
professionals to assess a family's strengths and vulnerabilities 
in relation to the present and future phases of the illness. 
According to Rolland (1988), each time phase has its own 
psychosocial tasks which require significantly different 
strengths, attitudes or changes from a family and thus are an 
important consideration in this study, because spouses are 
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interviewed at different points in time in the course of AD and 
stroke. Consequently, their descriptions and explanations of 
their illness experiences are likely to be shaped by, and give 
shape to, the psychosocial demands upon them at the time of 
interview. 
In her investigation of psychosocial response patterns to 
severe traumatic brain injury, Lezak {1986) acknowledges the 
importance of the time dimension by identifying six stages in the 
evolution of family reactions to a brain damaged person, while 
in Butchart's (1988) study of stresses within the contexts of 
brain damaged people findings were grouped according to their 
location in time relative to the trauma. In this study, the 
similarities and differences that AD and stroke caregivers are 
likely to experience will be analysed in accordance with 
Rolland's (1988) three major time phases: (a) crisis, (b) 
chronic, and {c) terminal. 
Crisis phase. According to Rolland (1988), this phase 
includes both the symptomatic period before actual diagnosis when 
the patient and family have a sense something is wrong, and the 
initial period of readjustment and coping after the problem has 
been clarified through a diagnosis and initial treatment plan. 
The crisis phase and the way in which it is dealt with by family 
members will differ in the case of AD and stroke. The sudden 
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upheaval due to the occurence of a stroke and the resulting shock 
experienced by the patient and his family is likely to have a 
greater impact than the gradual confusion and anxiety experienced 
by the AD patient and his family during the pre-diagnosis phase. 
After the diagnosis of AD, although the individual and his family 
may experience some relief that a diagnosis has finally been 
made, they will also probably experience shock followed by a 
phase of denial. The fact that physical impairment is not 
evident in the AD patient at this stage of the illness, unlike 
the stroke patient who is likely to manifest clear motor problems 
{such as hemiplegia), is probably what contributes to the denial 
evident in family members of AD patients. 
Chronic phase. This phase is the short or long time span 
between the initial diagnosis and readjustment period and the 
third phase when issues of death and terminal illness 
predominate. This phase, also known as "the long haul" or "day-
to-day living with chronic illness" phase (Rolland, 1988, p. 
155), can be characterized by constancy, progression or episodic 
change. Those families coping with stroke can usually come to 
terms psychologically and organizationally with the permanent 
changes presented by the stroke during this phase, al though those 
dealing with the aftermath of a massive stroke may have to cope 
with an exhausting problem "without end" (Rolland, 1988, p.155). 
Families which have to cope with the gradual incapacitation of 
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an AD patient also have to come to grips with a problem, which 
does not seem to end Consequently, the possibility of resuming 
a 'normal' life, might only come through the death of their ill 
member. 
Terminal phase. The final phase - the terminal period -
includes the preterminal stage of an illness where the 
inevitability of death becomes apparent and increasingly 
predominates in family life, as well as the periods of mourning 
and resolution of loss. Issues pertaining to separation, death, 
grief, resolution of mourning and resumption of 'normal' family 
life beyond the loss, distinguish this phase from the crisis and 
chronic phases. 
Culture 
The aim of this chapter has been to acknowledge the central 
role played by language in constructing and communicating 
individual and social reality and to develop a framework by which 
the reality of illness and that of disease can be legitimated. 
Through this process two premises central to this study have been 
articulated. Firstly, illness is a transactional, communicative 
and social experience; it is not simply personal. Secondly, 
because illness meanings are shared and negotiated, they cannot 
be considered independently of social networks, social situations 
59 
and different forms of social reality. 
According to Kleinman (1980), in every culture the 
experience and treatment of illness, and the social institutions 
relating to illness are systematically interconnected. The 
totality of these interrelationships is the health care system. 
In other words, the health care system, like other cultural 
systems, integrates the health-related components of society, 
including socially-legitimated statuses; patterns of belief about 
the· causes of illness; and norms governing choice and evaluation 
of treatment. 
Since illness experiences are culturally and socially 
embedded, the analysis of caregivers' illness experiences entails 
a recognition of their different cultural realities. These 
different cultures - "systems of shared ideas, systems of 
concepts and rules and meanings that underlie and are expressed 
in the ways that humans live" (Keesing, 1981, in Helman, 1990, 
p. 2 ) - determine the repertoire of narrative resources available 
to people accounting for an event in a particular time and place, 
and thus shape the way caregivers describe and explain their 
experiences, and how they cope with the illness. Caregivers' 
different cultural orientations will also determine which of the 
three structural domains of health care in society -
professional, popular (family, social network, community) or folk 
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(nonprofessional healers) - they will approach in order to 
understand and cope with the illness and the extent to which they 
will integrate their experiences within these domains with their 
own beliefs (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Local health care system: internal structure. 
Beliefs 
Choices and Decisions 
Roles 
Relationships 
Interaction Settings 
Professional Institutions 
Professional and folk 
sectors may or may not Health Care System 
overlap in particular 
local settings 
Folk sector 
Popular Sector: 
a. Individual-based 
b. Family-based 
c. Social Nexus-based 
d. Community-based 
Note. From Patients and healers in the context of culture 
(p. 50) by A. Kleinman, 1980, Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
In Western and non-Western societies between 70 and 90 percent 
of illness is managed solely within the popular domain, which 
comprises principally the family context of illness and care and 
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includes social network and community activities (Kleinman, 
1978). Decisions regarding when to seek aid in the other 
domains, whom to consult, whether to comply, and most lay 
evaluations of the efficacy of treatment, are made in the popular 
domain. 
The participants in the present study are members of either 
the Alzheimer's and Related Disorders Association (ARDA) or 
Stroke Aid, which are both community-based organizations within 
the popular domain of health care. Caregivers' consulations with 
nonprofessional healing specialists (such as ministers of 
religion) occur within the folk sector, while consultations with 
neurologists, general practitioners, psychologists, speech and 
occupational therapists occur within the professional domain. 
Consequently, caregivers, patients and family members are likely 
to talk about illness in a culture-wide language of experience, 
whereas professional practitioners do so in their sector-specific 
language of biological functions and behaviour. Thus, when 
acknowledging the cultural context of caregivers' illness 
experiences, one needs to recognise that the knowledge and 
practice of biomedicine is also culturally embedded. During 
their training health p=ofessionals undergo a form of 
enculturation as they slowly acquire the 'culture' of their 
chosen career; their clinical practice of this acquired culture 
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being influenced by local cultural norms. 
Helman (1990) describes culture as an inherited 'lens' 
through which individuals perceive and understand the world that 
they inhabit and learn how to live within it. One aspect of this 
cultural 'lens' is the division of the world and the people 
within it into different categories. For example, all cultures 
distinguish between men and women, and the healthy and ill. 
These categories are laden with different meanings and role 
expectations. In Western culture, women are traditionally 
defined as emotional, caring and maternal, whereas men are 
defined as practical, rational and financial providers. Thus, 
when a wife is confronted with the chronic illness of her 
husband, it is perhaps expected that she will be able to cope 
alone since this is a role that is 'natural' for her. On the 
other hand, when a husband is faced with his wife's illness, the 
delegation of the caregiving role to others is considered to be 
acceptable and understandable. For example, during the second 
interview with Ann z., whose husband is a stroke patient, she 
reflected upon the difficulties faced by male caregivers as a 
consequence of these cultural expectations. According to Ann, 
men delegate caregiving duties, because they are not accustomed 
to "running a home" and when suddenly confronted with this 
foreign role are likely to have difficulty coping: 
I think it is very difficult for the men caregivers, 
because they probably didn't know anything about 
. running a home and now suddenly they've got to do it. 
I know the one who comes from Florida - and there is 
no reason why - but her attitude is: I have had a 
stroke and I am not going to do anything. So, he had 
to give up his job, which has now put a financial 
burden on the whole thing, because she won't even make 
a cup of tea. She just expects him to do everything, 
and the last couple of weeks I didn't think he looked 
well at all. The strain is really telling, of trying 
to keep - he does a bit of work from home, but with 
having to do all the housework and the cooking and 
trying to make a bit of money (Stroke caregiver. 
Second interview, 4 September 1993.) 
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Implicit in Ann's explanation is the idea that, because women are 
familiar with the caregiving role prior to the onset of a chronic 
illness, they are likely to cope more effectively than men as 
caregivers of chronic illnesses. Further, Ann 'blames' the ill 
wife to whom she refers, attributing intention to what is 
reasonable to interpret as adynamia consequent on the stroke: 
"but her attitude is: I have had a stroke and I am not going to 
do anything". 
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Although women may find they are able to adjust to the 
caregiving role more readily than men in similar positions, the 
idea that women should be able to cope alone indefinitely when 
faced with chronic illness (because they are 'natural' 
caregivers) is a myth, and potentially detrimental to their well-
being. Consequently, it is no wonder that the majority of 
Alzheimer's caregiving studies show that female caregivers 
experience higher levels of distress and depression than do males 
in this role (Fitting, Rabins, Lucas & Eastham, 1986; Pruchno & 
Resch, 1989). The fact that male caregivers experience less 
distress and depression than female caregivers is not merely 
because men are more able to set limits on the amount of help 
they provide and tend to rely more on the support of others to 
provide care to patients (Biegel, Sales & Schulz, 1991, p. 153), 
but also because such behaviour on the part of men is sanctioned 
by society. In the case of women such behaviour is not expected, 
let alone sanctioned. Biegel, Sales and Schulz (1991) suggest 
various other variables as possible mediators of caregiving 
outcomes, such as the nature of the prior relationship between 
patients and caregivers, social support available to caregivers, 
and coping strategies used. Paul c., whose wife is an AD 
patient, explained that men possibly cope better emotionally than 
women in the caregiving role, because men are used to "stress" 
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and have been able to develop adequate coping skills over the 
years: "Most men have had responsible positions and have had 
stress all their lives and have learnt to cope with it" (AD 
caregiver. First interview, 25 July 1992). 
However, one should be cautious when describing culture as 
an inherited 'lens', because culture does not have "a free-
floating reality independent of any structural constraints" 
(Brittan & Maynard, 1984, p. 20). Rather, cultural meanings are 
transformed to fit new developments in technology over time. 
For example, it was noted in Chapter Three that the development 
of CAT scans has made it possible to diagnose AD, whereas in the 
past a diagnosis of AD could only be made post mortem. Thus, 
technological developments and an increase in the research of AD 
in recent years have led to a shift in lay people's definition 
and understanding of AD. For example, Karen N. pointed out 
during the second interview that "Alzheimer's is a new concept 
completely" and that in the past it was defined as "senility" and 
accepted as a normal process of ageing: "You know, Mom just said 
it was old age, and senility goes with old age" (AD caregiver. 
Second interview, 4 September 1993). Paul c. a}.so referred to 
this difference between the conceptualization of AD in the past 
and present: 
Looking back on my early youth, of course it (AD) was 
present even then and we used to call it "kuns", you 
know, old age, but it is the same thing. But, I think 
we recognise it now and of course people are living to 
a greater age where of course Alzheimer's really does 
start in the old age. (AD caregiver. First interview, 
25 July 1992) 
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There is thus a dialectical relationship between individual 
meanings and the wider social organization that is mediated 
through the medical care encounter (Anderson, Blue & Lau, 1991). 
Since our social world is thereby linked recursively to our inner 
experience (Kleinman, 1988b, preface), the exploration of 
caregivers' experiences will simultaneously entail an analysis 
of their social worlds; the analysis thereof involving not an 
experimental science in search of natural law, but an 
interpretive one in search of meaning. 
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CHAPTER 5 
METHODOLOGY 
The aim of this study is to explore caregivers' illness 
experiences as reflected in their narrative accounts of caring 
for their ill spouses. Accordingly, in order to retain the 
qualitative essence of these data, while at the same time 
systematically analyzing them, a discourse analytic style of 
inquiry involving the co-construction of narratives by the 
participants and researcher was regarded as the most appropriate 
methodological approach. 
Interviews 
In his critique of the standard approach to interviewing, 
Mishler (1986) proposes a reformulation of the interviewing 
process and outlines four premises which were adopted in this 
study: (a) An interview is a form of discourse, (b) the 
discourse of interviews is constructed jointly by interviewers 
and respondents, (c) analysis and interpretation are based on a 
theory of discourse and meaning, and (d) the meanings of 
questions and answers are contextually grounded. 
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Adopting Mishler' s ( 1986) interviewing approach has various 
implications for this study. Firstly, if an interview is a form 
of discourse constructed jointly by interviewers and respondents, 
the interview should be as minimally structured by the researcher 
as possible to enable respondents to communicate their ideas 
within their own frames of reference, while at the same time 
forcing interviewers to acknowledge their own contributions to 
the resultant dialogue. Secondly, an analysis and discussion of 
the interview material based on a theory of discourse and meaning 
would involve a qualitative analysis of the material and 
specifically a discourse-analytic approach. Thirdly, acceptance 
of the premise that the meanings of questions and answers are 
contextually grounded implies that generalisations cannot be made 
across contexts. In other words, the experiences of caregivers 
in this study cannot be generalised to all caregivers of stroke 
and AD. Rather, the idiosyncratic nature of each of the 
experiences of caregivers in this study should be acknowledged 
and broad generalisations avoided, because in addition to the 
meanings of questions and answers being contextually grounded, 
meanings which co-evolve through social interactions are multiple 
and shifting, rather than unitary and fixed (Burman, 1991, p. 
327). 
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Two interviews were conducted with each participant. The 
first interviews were conducted between 28 April 1992 and 25 July 
1992. These were unstructured so that the participants' 
narratives could develop and take their own shape during the 
interview process and thereby reflect the uniqueness of each 
spouse's illness experience. However, to ensure that the 
researcher did not approach each participant in a different 
manner the initial interviews began with a uniform introductory 
patter (see Appendix 1), which explained the aim of the study and 
reassured participants that their confidentiality would be 
ensured. 
Each initial interview was approximately 90 minutes long and 
all were taped on audio-cassette so that no significant data 
would be overlooked by the researcher and to facilitate rapport 
between the participant and researcher. Notes were not made 
during the interviews since it was assumed that this would 
interrupt the flow of the narrative process. 
After the first interviews had been conducted the tape-
recordings of the interviews were transcribed verbatim. These 
transcripts provided a basis for the structure of the second 
interviews. These were semi-structured along the lines described 
below, and conducted approximately 14 months later between 
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4 September 1993 and 2 November 1993. The assumption was 
that the second interview would provide an opportunity to 
elaborate on the narratives co-constructed in the first interview 
in such a way as to reflect whatever continuities and changes in 
experience had occurred between the two points of interview. 
Statements requiring elaboration were identified by analysing the 
first interviews and selecting vague comments and descriptions 
which, if explored further, would provide a more in-depth 
understanding of caregivers' illness experiences and an 
opportunity for identifying the four layers of illness meaning 
outlined by Kleinman (1988b). The second interviews were 
each approximately 60 minutes long and were also taped on audio-
cassettes and transcribed verbatim. 
Both the first and second interviews were conducted in 
participants' homes since this was the most convenient context 
for them. Kleinman (1980) has also suggested that explanatory 
models are more easily elicited and more accurately reported in 
the patient's or caregiver's home by a researcher who is not 
associated with the delivery of medical care. Only o-e 
interview, the second interview with a spouse whose wife is an 
AD patient, was conducted telephonically because he and his 
wife had moved to Knysna to live with their daughter. 
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Method of Analysis 
A qualitative analysis of interview material was performed 
using the four levels of illness meaning (symptom, cultural 
significance, life world, explanation) outlined by Kleinman 
(1988b) as a framework. Accordingly, it was hypothesized that 
the caregivers' illness language would be shaped by: (a) Their 
evaluation of the demands of the situation; (b) the active 
participation of the researcher and caregivers and their mutual 
influence in the co-construction of the narratives; and (c) the 
illness experiences co-constructed in other domains - popular, 
professional and folk - which incorporate different settings, 
practices and explanations of illness (Helman, 1990; Kleinman, 
1980). 
After the first interviews were conducted and transcribed 
verbatim, each was divided into core themes derived from the 
text, such as the participant's definition of the illness, 
description of the onset of the illness, and explanation of its 
cause. During this process, vague comments and obscure 
descriptions which were related to the different themes in each 
text were noted so that the meanings of these statements could 
be clarified during the second interviews. For example, analysis 
of the first interview with Ann z., whose husband is a stroke 
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stroke patient, revealed that one of the core themes in her 
particular narrative was the cause of the illness. However, 
discussion about the cause of her husband's stroke was brief: 
RESEARCHER: 
ANN: 
What kind of stroke was it? 
Well, they have never told me! He 
never ever gave me precisely where the thing 
was and they did brain scans and EEGs. 
(Stroke caregiver. First interview, 5 June 
1992) 
Thus, in the second interview with Ann, the researcher enquired 
about what she believed caused her husband's illness. Although 
the neurologist never discussed the cause of the stroke with her, 
it was hypothesised that Ann had probably constructed an 
explanation of the cause in an attempt to reduce the anxiety 
consequent on the uncertainty created by her husband's stroke. 
The core themes which emerged during the analysis of each 
of the first interviews were compared, and themes which were 
prominent in some caregiver's narratives but not in others, 
noted. The researcher could then, during the second interview, 
enquire about that particular caregiver's experiences and 
understanding of the theme, which had not been discussed during 
the first interview. For example, in most of the first 
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interviews caregivers related their experiences of encounters 
they had had with health professionals, such as neurologists. 
However, this theme did not evolve during the first interview 
with Peter D., and was therefore noted and discussed during the 
second interview. 
After the second interviews were conducted and transcribed, 
the researcher once again identified distinctive themes in each 
of the narratives and compared these with those which had 
developed during the first interviews. Analysis and comparison 
of these themes and the language used by the participants enabled 
the researcher to reflect on the continuities and changes in 
caregiver's experiences over time. 
Participants 
To recruit participants for the study, contact was made with 
the leaders of two different organizations - Stroke Aid and the 
Alzheimer's Disease and Related Disorders Association (ARDA) -
both of which are based in Johannesburg. These leaders were 
requested by the researcher to inform those of their members who 
were married to a spouse suffering from Alzheimer's disease or 
stroke about the study, and to encourage these members' 
participation. The leader of Stroke Aid provided the researcher 
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with the names and telephone numbers of five women and four men, 
caregivers of stroke patients, who were interested in 
participating in the study. The leaders of two different ARDA 
support groups reported that two men and two women, whose spouses 
were diagnosed as suffering from AD, had volunteered to 
participate in the research and their names and telephone numbers 
were provided. The volunteers were contacted telephonically by 
the researcher two weeks later to determine whether they were 
still interested in participating in the study since they may 
have reconsidered their participation for various reasons. Four 
of the volunteers, two widows of stroke victims and two husbands 
of stroke patients, had decided against participating in the 
study. The one widow felt it would be too traumatic to revive 
old and painful experiences, while the other three volunteers 
claimed that they were too busy to participate in the research. 
The researcher was unable to contact two of the volunteers 
telephonically and therefore seven of the 13 volunteers - three 
men and four women - participated in the study (see Table 1). 
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Table 1 
Summary of respondents and patients. 
CAREGIVERS NAME AGE OF AGE OF YEARS YEARS 
CAREGIVER PATIENT ILL MARRIED 
STROKE Ann z. 64 82 3 35 
Mary X. 68 74 3 50 
Peter D. 76 74 1 42 
ALZHEIMER'S Cynthia P. 64 68 10 41 
DISEASE Karen N. 59 72 16 35 
Paul C. 
* 75 75 6 49 Michael A. 81 77 4 53 
* Second interview was conducted on the telephone. 
Scrutiny of Table 1 shows that the the stroke patients have 
a generally shorter period of illness than AD patients. 
Consequently, AD caregivers are likely to place more emphasis on 
the mundane, monotonous nature of day-to-day living with an AD 
patient and their experiences of this problem "without end", such 
as feelings of loneliness, helplessness and depression. In 
addition, it is important to note that because the participants 
are all members of associations devoted to supporting relatives 
of patients with stroke or AD, they are unlikely to be 
representative of the caregiver population not served by such 
organisations. In fact, according to representatives from these 
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organizations, Stroke Aid has a mere 80 members, whereas ARDA has 
approximately 690 members. Therefore, it is possible that there 
are stroke and AD patients and caregivers who are unaware of the 
existence of these organizations. However, since the aim of this 
study is to demonstrate an approach to eliciting and 
understanding the uniqueness of each individual case, this 
sampling limitation is of less significance than would be the 
case with quantitative, questionnaire based studies. 
The following two chapters present an analysis, discussion 
and comparision of the spouses' narratives. Chapter Six deals 
with the caregivers' reconstructions of the interpersonal, 
behavioural and social damage consequent on their spouses' 
illnesses, and Chapter Seven deals with their cognitive and 
practical efforts at repairing this damage. Due to the amount 
of data collected in the interviews, and for reasons of 
confidentiality, the transcripts of the interviews have not been 
provided and the names of the participants have been excluded. 
Quotations (as recorded verbatim) are used to illustrate the 
points made in the discussion. 
CHAPTER 6 
THROUGH THE NARRATIVE WINDOW: DAMAGE AND DECAY 
To fully appreciate the sick person's and the family's 
experience, the clinician must first piece together 
the illness narrative as it emerges from the patient's 
and the family's complaints and explanatory models; 
then he or she must interpret· it in light of the 
different modes of illness meanings - symptom symbols, 
culturally salient illnesses, personal and social 
contexts. (Kleinman, 1988b, p. 49) 
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The aim of this chapter is to discuss the narratives 
produced through the method described in Chapter Five, and 
thereby reflect upon their uniqueness and the multiple meanings 
that radiate from caregivers' illness experiences, while at the 
same time elucidating similarities between the narratives. 
Therefore, underlying this discussion is a tension between 
preserving the idiosyncratic nature of caregivers' experiences 
and identifying commonalities between the narratives, such as in 
terms of structure, the themes which evolved during the narrative 
process, and the language used to describe and explain illness 
experiences. 
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Structure 
Sequential analysis of the episodes that together make up 
each initial interview reveals that all involve descriptions of: 
(a) The patient before and after the the onset of the illness, 
(b) the extent to which spouses' lives have changed, (c) the 
way spouses have accommodated to this change and (d) the way 
health professionals and others have responded to the illness. 
There are few similarities in the order in which these 
descriptions were presented. The stroke caregivers initially 
spoke of the extent to which their lives had changed since the 
onset of their spouses' illness, whereas the AD caregivers 
(except for Michael A., who spoke of his support group 
experiences) began their stories with descriptions of their 
spouses before and after the onset of AD. This suggests that 
the sudden occurrence of the stroke was perhaps the most 
significant of stroke caregivers' experiences 1 whereas for AD 
caregivers the extent to which their spouses had deteriorated 
during the course of the illness seemed to be of greater 
significance than the pace at which the illness had progressed. 
Other structural commonalities between narratives concerned 
their form rather than sequence. Embedded within the structure 
of the narratives are multiple stories, which reconstruct events 
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that occurred either prior to the illness or at different points 
in the illness course. These stories served different functions. 
At times they illustrated a particular experience or belief that 
the caregiver was attempting to communicate, and on other 
occasions were employed to contextualise a particular event. 
For example, Peter D. described an incident which occurred "quite 
a few years back" before his wife had her first stroke, to 
explain when the doctor discovered she had high blood pressure: 
I tell you what happened. Quite a few years back -
this goes quite a few years back now - getting into a 
lift, the lift door closed on her and it threw her 
against the wall and dislocated her shoulder. And, 
uh, well, I got a doctor to her and he said, "No, it's 
just a slight bruising" and that was all. But, about 
three days later when she was still crying, I got hold 
of him and I said, "No ways, this isn't that! There 
must be something more to it." Then he went and had 
it x-rayed and found it was dislocated. She was lying 
there for about three days with a dislocated shoulder. 
Anyway, he referred us to a specialist and when the 
specialist heard this he tried to get him on the 
phone. Anyway, I think it was just as well. That's 
when they discovered she had high blood pressure. 
(Stroke caregiver. First interview, 24 July 1992) 
During the course of the initial interviews, caregivers 
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provided few explanations of their illness experiences, and 
rather focused on descriptions of their experiences. The 
relative absence of explanations from the initial interviews 
could be because the caregivers needed to convey the dramatic, 
disruptive impact of the illness on their lives and thereby 
convince the researcher of their plight, or a function of 
previous encounters with health professionals when their 
experiences were disqualified and considered irrelevant. 
Thus, the second interviews provided an opportunity for the 
researcher to explore their explanations and, as described in 
Chapter Five, vague explanations were noted during the analysis 
of the first interviews. For example, during the first interview 
with Ann Z., she reported that the neurosurgeon never told her 
what type of stroke her husband had had, and described how she 
challenged the doctor to discharge her husband from hospital, 
because he was not receiving any treatment: "Well, you know he's 
just lying in hospital here! He's not having any treatment. 
What's the point? Why can't I take him home?" (First interview, 
5 June 1992). During the second interview, when the researcher 
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enquired whether Ann had any ideas about what may have caused her 
husband's stroke, she initially provided a medical description 
from which flowed her belief that if you harbour "things for 
years", "you can make yourself ill": 
Well, obviously it was a clot. Because, if he had had 
a hemorrhage, he would have had different symptoms ... 
Mr z. does not believe me, but I think he is not a 
very ••. he is not emotional he doesn't like 
discussing things that upset him and I think he 
has been harbouring things for years and I really 
believe that if you do that you can make yourself ill. 
(Second interview, 4 September 1993) 
Thus, because the second interviews were more structured, 
caregivers' explanations of t'1eir experiences are more prominent 
in these interviews. Nevertheless, similarities and differences 
within caregivers' descriptions of their experiences between the 
two points of interview do become evident with the second 
interviews, and portray the ongoing struggle caregivers 
experience when faced with chronic illness. 
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Transformations: From Health to Illness 
Analysis of the descriptions which emerged in the initial 
interviews reveals that decisions concerning when and where to 
seek medical help were made only once symptoms were defined by 
caregivers themselves as signs of ill heal th. For example, Peter 
D. described the onset of his wife's stroke as follows: 
Suddenly, I don't know, but for no rhyme nor reason, 
we were just sitting outside on the back verandah 
having lunch when she started picking her food with 
her hands. I said, "What's the matter?", but she was 
non compos mentis. I took her to the room and got the 
doctor. He said, "No, get her to the hospital! It's 
a slight stroke." (First interview, 24 July 1992) 
However, Peter did not define the sudden occurrence of this 
"slight stroke" as a "serious" problem, and to substantiate this 
belief he explained that, although his wife "couldn't remember" 
after this "slight stroke", "it was nothing". Peter's use of the 
word "nothing" suggests that, because his wife's memory 
impairment was not visible, he did not believe it was a problem: 
there was nothing there, there was nothing wrong then. 
I mean from then until she had this last thing there 
was nothing wrong; I mean as far as living was 
concerned. She could help herself. She did 
everything for herself. She cooked, she did, the only 
thing as I say, she couldn't remember, you know, 
current event sort of things. But, that was nothing, 
that was nothing. (First interview, 24 July 1992) 
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In the case of Paul c., he traced the onset of his wife's illness 
(AD) to "lapses in memory", which only with hindsight did he 
define as symptoms of an illness: 
It's been progressive over some four or five years, I 
suppose, but gradually the pace increases. The first 
two or three years one more or less accepted it as 
more lapses in memory and things like that. Looking 
back it was obviously the start of this brain disease 
and it progressively gets worse and worse. (First 
interview, 25 July 1992) 
Thus, both Peter and Paul construed changes in their wives' 
memories as non-pathological. This could reflect a belief that 
absent-mindedness is a 'normal' consequence of ageing, or the 
distinction people in Western cultures make between 'body' and 
'soul'; 'illness' being 'body' and 'memory' being 'soul'. 
Gr'iffith, Griffith and Slovik (1990) refer to the fact that in 
everyday epistemology, as well as in the specialized vocabularies 
of modern medicine and psychiatry, a philosophical dualism 
between mental and physiological events is readily apparent: 
We constantly use language to distinguish mental and 
physiological domains as we observe the behavior of 
ourselves or others, and we employ theories, usually 
implicit, about how the mental and physiological may 
be interacting to produce the behavior. (Griffith, 
Griffith & Slovik, 1990, pp. 13-14) 
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Cynthia P., the wife of an AD patient, also described how during 
the initial stages of the illness she did not define her 
husband's behaviour as indicative of disease, but rather as 
"peculiar", using a story to illustrate her definition: 
... but insidiously that not for a minute did I think 
he was ill or that he had Alzheimer's. I just 
thought, no, but he's getting most peculiar. We used 
to have a nice business in town and he was doing 
peculiar things. I know that I once went overseas to 
see my children and we had this very nice shop in town 
and we were expecting the building to come down, and 
while I was away Mr P. got notice. So, you would 
think that he would've gotten up and read the papers 
and looked for new premises. And, what he really did 
was - there was a lady who, she actually had nothing 
to do with our business, she came in as a locum to 
help while I was away - and he sent her to look for 
premises and I remember I can't understand this ! Why 
doesn't he go himself? (First interview, 8 July 1992) 
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Reflecting upon this time preceding her redefinition of his 
unusual behaviour as signs of disease, Cynthia described the 
confusion she experienced, and also hinted at a sense of having 
failed to do everything she might have done to help him: 
The first six or seven years were very gradual with 
just a lot of tensions, because I think I didn't 
realise he was sick. Like, for example, we'd get in 
a car and we were going somewhere - say to his sister 
- and he'd say, " So which way do you want to go?" 
And I'd say, "What do you mean which way do I want to 
go? There's only one way to go!" What I didn't 
realise was that he was saying, "Help me! I don't 
know which way to go?" Um, so there were a lot of 
tensions, because one didn't know and neither did he. 
(First interview, 8 July 1992) 
It was only at the stage when the "silly little things became 
more major things" - for example, when her husband paid the same 
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account twice - that Cynthia started to redefine her husband's 
behaviour as symptoms of disease. 
Like Cynthia, Karen N. also defined her husband's behaviour 
as 'abnormal' at the point when his behaviour had a disruptive 
effect on their lives. For example, he too was paying the same 
accounts "two or three times during the month": 
As I say this has been thirteen and a half years. 
It's a long time. It started off where he had 
phobias, jealousy about me. You know, I was having an 
affair with the next door neighbour and this sort of 
thing. He sort of got lost driving the car and he 
would have little accidents, because his reaction time 
wasn't great, you know, and I would find that accounts 
were being paid two or three times during the month. 
And that's when I actually took him and we had him 
tested at the Gen. (Karen N., AD caregiver. First 
interview, 3 June 1992) 
However, caregivers' definitions of their spouses' 
behaviours as being symptomatic of a disease and their decisions 
to seek medical advice were not only based on the extent to which 
their spouses' behaviours were disrupting their lives, as in the 
case of Cynthia and Karen, but also hinged on the 'normative' 
expectations of their partners developed during the course of 
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their marriages, and upon past experience they had had with 
similar illness. For example, Ann z. described how the 
neurosurgeon did not believe that her husband had had a stroke, 
whereas based on what she had experienced of her sister-in-law's 
stroke she "recognised it immediately": 
And I was rather, more than rather irritated with the 
neurosurgeon, because I think he thought, he gave me 
the impression that I was making a fuss about nothing. 
And first of all, I suppose I was fortunate, this was 
not the first time I had encountered a stroke, so I 
recognised it immediately. (First interview, 5 June 
1992) 
As well as being irritated by the neurosurgeon's refusal to 
believe her, Ann felt disconfirmed and unfairly excluded from 
the 'diagnostic' process, arguing that her knowledge of her 
husband being so much more extensive than that of the 
neurosurgeon, he should have respected her perceptions: 
And I feel that the neuro should have taken notice of 
what I had observed, after all I've lived with him for 
years, and I know how he reacts and what he looks like 
and what he does, but he wasn't interested. (First 
Interview, 5 June 1992) 
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Caregivers' descriptions of their partners' behaviours both 
before and after the onset of the illness not only served to 
define whether or not their spouses' behaviour was symptomatic 
of an illness, but also provided an opportunity to explore the 
impact it had had on their lives. For instance, Michael A., 
whose wife is an AD patient, spoke of how difficult it was for 
him to sell the home where he had lived with his wife for 47 
years and move into an old age home with her. However, Michael 
was even more hurt by the fact that, after 52 years of marriage, 
his wife didn't seem to "care a hell" whether he was "alive or 
not", and feelings of bitterness, anger and sorrow pervaded his 
description of her. He thus blamed her for not caring and 
experienced this as being "worse than her death". This implies 
that he believed she had some agency or control over her 
behaviour, whereas her apparent lack of interest in him was a 
function of emotional blunting consequent on the brain damage: 
MICHAEL: But, you must not feel sorry for them. They 
are not sorry for you. And I have come to 
learn that this year. She doesn't c.1re a 
hell if I'm alive or not. 
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RESEARCHER: From listening to you talking, I think, from 
the sounds of things, this must have been 
the most difficult thing for you; the fact 
that she does not seem to care anymore? 
MICHAEL: It's worse than her death ... I feel it is 
worse. But I am still her husband. (Second 
Interview, September 1993) 
The disconnectedness that Karen N. experienced in relation 
to her husband, who is an AD patient, resulted in her feeling 
"terribly, terribly lonely". Although she looked after her 
grandchildren during the day, it was as though her husband's 
inability to discuss various issues with her had led to her 
feeling abandoned. This feeling of abandonment was more deeply 
felt in the afternoon and evening when she was alone with her 
husband: 
It's terribly terribly lonely, as I can tell you, no 
matter what - I still look after the kids during the 
day and that's a big help to me. But, ag, come sort 
of afternoon and evening, you can't discuss what's 
going on in the country; you can't discuss family 
problems. You can't discuss anything. (Second 
interview, 4 September 1993) 
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Stroke caregivers also experienced being disconnected from their 
ill spouses, and Mary X. described how "hard" it was for her to 
not "discuss anything" with her husband, because she feared he 
would "completely go to pieces". Thus, she believed that in 
order to prevent her husband from having another stroke, she had 
to protect him from any existing and all potential uncertainties: 
He can't handle anything and it is hard for me, you 
know, because I can't discuss anything with him. I 
can't say to him, "What do you think I should do?", in 
a certain situation, because, you know, if there is 
something in the post and as I open it and am staring 
at it, he asks, "What's the matter? What's the 
matter?", and I say, "No, it's nothing", and I've got 
to make up something (Second interview, 11 September 
1993). 
However, the disconnectedness that caregivers experienced 
in relation to their ill spouses appeared to be even stronger 
when they spoke of their relationships with family members, 
friends and others in their social networks. This social 
disconnection is explored in the following section. 
91 
Social disconnection 
Analysis of the narratives reveals that caregivers' 
experiences of disconnectedness in relation to their children 
differed to those experienced in relation to other family members 
and acquaintances. Whereas children were perceived as being 
disengaged and uninvolved in the caregiving process, 
acquaintances were construed as prejudiced. Various explanations 
for this disengagement and prejudice were provided by the 
caregivers and are now discussed. 
Stigmatization 
The normal and the stigmatized are not persons but 
rather perspectives. (Goffman, 1963, p. 138) 
In different epochs and societies the cultural significance 
of symptoms and illness are often of a stigmatizing kind. 
The .term 'stigma', taken from the Greek, means 'to mark or brand' 
and was originally used to refer to marks that publicly disgraced 
the person, but in recent times it has been used to refer to 
disgrace rather than actual bodily marks. Kleinman (1988b) 
identifies cancer, heart disease and the new venereal epidemics -
herpes and AIDS - as disorders which lead to stigmatization in 
this period in the West. However, the fact that he does not 
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include stroke and AD among these disorders, does not mean that 
those who experience stroke and AD do not encounter 
stigmatization. It is evident from caregivers' narratives that 
these illnesses do lead to stigmatization and a resultant sense 
of being ostracised by and disconnected from friends and family 
members. Illnesses such as leprosy and AIDS were u,sed as 
metaphors to convey experiences of isolation and stigmatization: 
Not one woman (from the bowling club) has come to my 
house in these two years; come over and said, "How are 
you?" They're scared; as though you've got leprosy 
... Nobody comes. It's like I've got a disease. 
(Michael A., AD caregiver. First Interview, 10 June 
1992) 
Ann z., whose husband had a stroke, referred to the 
"extraordinary" fact that the family have "stayed away" and that 
as a result she could empathise with AIDS sufferers, because her 
experience of family members' behaviours led to her feeling as 
though she had AIDS, the plague, or some other infectious 
disease: "Well, the family are extraordinary. I think I can 
feel for people who have got AIDS, because you would think we've 
got the plague or something. The family have just stayed away" 
(First interview, 5 June 1992). Other caregivers, such as 
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Mary X., strove to actively maintain contact with friends, but 
on failing to do so arrived at similarly embittered conclusions 
regarding the insincerity of "friends": 
You know it's very strange. I try and get as many 
friends of his to come and visit him, but you know, 
Caroline, it's a funny thing in life - when you lose 
your money, when you lose your health, you lose your 
so-called friends. (Mary X., stroke caregiver. First 
interview, 28 April 1992) 
Cynthia P. was also disillusioned with friends, and like 
Mary, seemed to believe that because "friends" felt that they 
could not benefit from a friendship with her and her husband, 
they did not maintain contact with them: 
I find them (friends) bad, ja, I find them bad. We 
have one couple who've remained our friends. For the 
rest, we sit at home. We were a very gregarious, 
almost sought-after couple. We both are outgoing. We 
like people. We had a good social life. We had a 
good social circle. We were, you know, sought-after 
sort of thing, and now, you know, we sit home night 
after night after night. (AD caregiver. First 
interview, 8 July 1992) 
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In their attempts to understand this disintegration of 
previous relationships and estrangement from their social 
networks, the caregivers constructed different explanations. 
On the one hand, they saw this as a process set in motion by the 
perceptions others held of their ill spouses. For example, 
Karen N. attributed people's avoidance of her and her husband to 
them feeling "awkward" in the presence of an AD patient, while 
Paul C. explained that the lack of reciprocity from the AD 
patient and the patient's inability to recognise acquaintances 
underlay the dissolution of friendships: 
Friends come and see you, but when, I mean your wife 
doesn't even know them then there isn't much object 
really in maintaining the friendship is there? You 
don't come and see people and just sit. There's no 
exchange. There's no contact at all. So, I mean 
there isn't much object in them coming so they just 
stop coming. (First interview, 25 July 1992) 
Mary X. explained that her husband's tendency to repeat himself, 
his limited conversation due to his verbal entrapment in the "old 
days", and inability to talk about current events, were likely 
to "irritate" people to the extent that they would not visit him 
in the future: 
None of his friends 'phone him and if I tell you he 
didn't have dozens, he had hundreds. And nobody 
phones or comes to see him, because I can see they 
don't understand and they get irritated. He's got 
limited conversation. He doesn't know anything about 
current affairs. He knows that there are a lot of 
problems and a lot of violence ... He can't really sit 
and discuss his views about anything. (Second 
interview, 11 September 1993) 
95 
On the other hand, caregivers described how they actively 
sought to manage closure of family boundaries by preventing 
interaction with others because it was "embarrassing": "From 
your point of view as a caregiver you feel embarrassed. So, I 
think I, from my point of ·view, tend to limit social activity" 
(Karen N., AD caregiver. First interview, 3 June 1992). In 
addition to caregivers feeling "embarrassed", and consequently 
wanting to protect themselves from future loss of face, they also 
expressed a need to protect the patient from such situations: 
Plus, I don't look for new friends. It's 
embarrassing! My poor husband can't speak, so he 
tries to say something and it doesn't want to come out 
and everybody's sitting listening. Why put him into 
such a situation? (Cynthia P., AD caregiver, First 
interview, 8 July 1992) 
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Exemplifying how caregivers acted to reduce the amount of social 
contact by serving as a gatekeeper to the patient, Michael A. 
described how he shielded his wife from what he considered was 
the victimisation consequent on her social activities: 
She was founder of this (bowling) club. I had to 
resign her from this club. She used to say, "I can't 
carry my woods". I put her down second, because she 
doesn't remember which is her own woods to play and 
she always plays with somebody else's woods, but I can 
see the girls resented it. But, girls, you know, 
women are bitches. They don't say anything to the 
person, but behind your back they will talk. I had to 
resign her. It broke my heart - after 20/30 years! 
(AD caregiver. First interview, 10 June 1992) 
Family Disengagement 
Whereas the lack of understanding and antipathy that 
caregivers experienced from friends was framed in terms of 
prejudice, the disconnectedness they experienced in relation 
to their children tended to be construed in less conflictual 
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terms. For instance, Mary X. attributed the disengagement she 
experienced in relation to her children to differences in 
knowledge: 
Like you know, he can't use a knife and fork properly, 
because he gets confused with a knife and fork, you 
see. So, I cut up his meal and he just sort of uses 
a fork. And you know, my kids say to me, "Stop itl 
Don't do thatl" But they don't understand that it's 
not because he can't cut the food; he can't 
distinguish. You know like you' 11 give him a plate of 
soup and he'll take a fork, you know. (Mary X., stroke 
caregiver. First interview, 28 April 1992) 
Incidents such as these led to Mary's decision to discuss 
various issues with her children as little as possible: "You 
know, if I say anything - I don't want to say too much - they 
say, 'Oh, just tell him to stop it. It's enough already!' You 
see, because they don't understand" (First interview, 28 April 
1992). 
However, other caregivers were less understanding of their 
children's attitudes. For example, Michael A. was angry about 
the seemingly ridiculous advice his children gave him and their 
apparent insensitivity toward his wife, and was determined that 
he was not going to put her in a home as though she was "a 
dog (that) you put in a kennel": 
Now my children want me to be nasty to my wife. They 
said because I've got my life to lead. I'm 81 and 
she's 77 and I'm very active. So, they said, "You 
must go and lead your own life! Her life is gone. She 
doesn't think she is sick" She (his daughter) 
tells me to get out of the house, but I just can't. 
So I take the car, I drive around. I go around seven 
blocks and I come back ... And my daughter says I'm 
wrong, "Go to a show, take a walk around the block!" 
Would·you like to walk by yourself at six or eight 
o'clock at night; walk around a couple of blocks by 
yourself? ... My daughter advised me to put her in a 
home. It's not like a dog you put in a kennel. (AD 
caregiver. First interview, 10 June 1992) 
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During the second interview with Cynthia P., she spoke sadly 
about the fact that her children "seem to wash their hands of" 
the caregiving process and that "they're not there", but yet are 
"great advice-givers": 
Cynthia: But, believe me, at the end of the day, the 
only person who cares is the spouse. Nobody 
Researcher: 
Cynthia: 
Researcher: 
Cynthia: 
Researcher: 
Cynthia 
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gives a damn. No children - and I've heard 
this from a lot of people 
Yes, yes 
Have you as well? 
In fact from the stroke caregivers as well! 
They seem to wash their hands of it! 
Or they try to help, but they have different 
ideas of how to help, so arguments develop 
Yes, yes. Correct. They're not there, 
they're not around, but they're great 
advice-givers. (AD caregiver. Second 
interview, 9 September 1993) 
Caregivers constructed different explanations in their 
attempts to understand such disagreements and disengagement 
within their families. The most prominent to emerge was that 
their children have "got their lives to live, which they live" 
(Karen N., AD caregiver. Second interview, 4 September 1993). 
Peter D. explained that "most of the burden" of his wife's 
illness had been on him, because his daughter had "her own life": 
The trouble is my wife and I are virtually on our own. 
We've got a daughter. But she's got her own life and 
her own children to look after, which makes it a bit 
difficult for her to do very much - plus a full time 
job - which means, you know, that most of the burden 
has been on me. (Stroke caregiver. First interview, 
24 July 1992) 
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Another explanation provided by Mary x. to make sense of the fact 
that her children were uninvolved in the care of their father 
after his stroke, was the effect of the patient's illness 
behaviour on the children: "You know, my daughter is very 
nervous. In fact, she was at the nursing home the one day when 
he was absolutely demented. You know, she had to put herself to 
bed with tranquillizers for two days" (First interview, 28 April 
1992). 
Cynthia P. and Karen N. (AD caregivers) also attributed the 
unsupportive behaviour of their children's to the nature of their 
children's relationships with the ill parent in the past: 
Cynthia: And my young son I'm very bitter about, 
because he's got everything going for him 
and about a year or half a year ago I said 
to him, ".Really, I need a bit of help. Just 
once a month or once in six weeks, come and 
take Daddy away and just get him off my back 
for an afternoon". And they just don't -
nothing. 
Researcher: 
Cynthia: 
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Could a possible reason be that they saw the 
way their father was towards you - very 
demanding - and that's also affected their 
compassion in a way? 
Maybe. I've also thought that just as he 
was a lousy husband, he was a lousy father. 
So, I thought to myself - what did he ever 
do for them? But, then I think to myself 
that I'm not asking them to do it for him. 
I'm asking for me! (AD caregiver. First 
interview, 8 July 1992) 
Unlike Cynthia who was obviously bitter about the fact that her 
"young son" did not respond to her request that he take his 
father "off (her) back for an afternoon", Karen seemed to feel 
betrayed by her daughter's devotion to her father in that "she 
absolutely worships the ground he walks on", and appeared to give 
up hope that her children would "show that kind of caring and 
support" she so desperately needed: 
If the kids would come to support group meetings ... 
I see other people and they have their kids come with 
them. You know, it shows that kind of caring and 
support, but I don't get that from my children ... And 
my daughter thinks to this day that I am very hard on 
Mr N. She absolutely worships the ground he walks on 
and I don't think she will ever understand until such 
time as she personally has to look after him and 
whether that time will ever come I don't know. So, 
from that point of view I don't get support from the 
kids. I've got to make major decisions myself. (Karen 
N., AD caregiver. Second interview, 4 September 
1993) 
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The disagreements between Karen and her children regarding the 
care of Mr N. have led to her children defining her as "hard and 
unsympathetic". Distraught and frustrated by this definition, 
Karen interpreted this response from her children as an 
indication of their denial that their father is ill and their 
lack of knowledge about AD: 
They just think that I am very hard and unsympathetic 
and I don't know how to get through to them to try and 
study it. I don't know. Well, I've come to the 
conclusion that they actually don't want to face 
reality. They want to try and remember Mr N. as he 
was - an efficient headmaster, a science man ... a 
pole-vaulter in his heyday ... They can't accept what 
he has become. (AD caregiver. Second interview, 4 
September 1993) 
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Cynthia also explained how the lack of reciprocity from the AD 
patient could be a contributing factor in her children's non-
participation in the care of her husband: 
It is very difficult, because you cannot have a 
relationship with these people. You cannot l Even our 
little three year old grandson knows that when he 
speaks to grandpa, it's different to speaking to other 
people. (Second interview, 9 September 1993) 
Cynthia also drew upon the idea that there are gender specific 
roles. It seems that this idea was based on her experiences of 
sons' and daughters' attendance at support group meetings. She 
accounted for attendance differences as follows: 
It's difficult for the boy who's got, after all, a 
wife and family, whereas a daughter is different 
Daughters are totally different. I can see in our 
support group - the ladies that have got daughters -
the daughters always go with to the group. My son 
came once with me and he said, ag, he doesn't see that 
there's anything there for him. (First interview, 8 
July 1992) 
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Exploitation 
Although all the caregivers experienced being disconnected 
from family members and friends, some did have occasional contact 
with relatives, but did not regard this contact as being for the 
sake of friendship. For instance, Ann z. believed that the 
contact she had with her family after her husband's stroke was 
purely for utilitarian reasons, because they would "only come 
when they wanted something". This belief was confirmed during 
a conversation with her sister, who seemed to feel guilty about 
not having contacted Ann more frequently after Mr Z's stroke: 
"My family have only come when they want something ... And 
actually my sister said to me, 'This sounds awful. It sounds as 
though I only 'phone when I want something'. So, I said, 'Well, 
you said it and not me!'" (First interview, 5 June 1992). 
Other caregivers, such as Cynthia P. and Karen N., spoke of 
how their children w0uld request that they look after the 
grandchildren, thus exploiting their domestic entrapment. 
However, their children framed these requests in positive terms 
and seemed to believe that they were being helpful to their 
caregiving parents; a belief which was not shared with the 
caregivers. For instance, although Cynthia acknowledged that it 
was "lovely" to see her grandson, she felt that this did not help 
105 
in caring for her husband: "You know, they think that if they 
bring their little boy here, then that's a lovely outing for us. 
Well, it's lovely to have the little boy, but that's not helping 
me in terms of their father" (Cynthia P., AD caregiver. First 
interview, 8 July 1992). Feelings of exploitation were more 
evident in Karen's case, because when she requested anything from 
her children she would "always get the impression the children 
are too busy", and yet she was always prepared to help when they 
requested anything from her: 
Last week I asked my son to buy a soccerball for me 
and I asked him to please drop it off after 'varsity 
on Tuesday. Well, yesterday was Friday and, because 
I had the kids and I was working in their garden -
always doing things for them - I was still there when 
he came home. He took the ball out of the car and 
gave it to me. To them it is unimportant, but to me -
they just don't have the time to do things for me. (AD 
caregiver. Second interview, 4 September 1993) 
During the first interview with Peter D., he spoke of the 
considerable effort he and his wife had made over the years to 
help various family members when they were experiencing problems, 
and how these members had "never bothered" to help them after his 
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wife's stroke. He was hurt, angry and disillusioned by this lack 
of concern and was determined that he would not allow them to 
exploit him or his wife in the future: 
Well, I'm the hell in. No ways will they get anything 
out of me! I know damn well that if anything happens 
to her and she died they're gonna come and say, "Oh 
well, what about this? What about that?" They can 
jump in the lake. Not one of them will get a damn 
thing 1 Not a thing 1 . . . I was actually feeling so fed 
up the other day and I said to the girl the other day, 
"You know, all these people, they mustn't come around 
my house afterwards, because I'll chase them." I 
said, "I don't want them here." (First interview, 24 
July 1992) 
Authenticity and Uncertainty 
In contrast to the caregivers of stroke victims, AD 
caregivers have to deal with feelings of anxiety consequent upon 
etiological uncertainty. People also tend to question the 
authenticity of AD caregivers' experiences, because (particularly 
in the early stages of AD) there are no physically visible 
symptoms of the disease. However, in the case of stroke, 
hemiplegia and aphasia are noticeable: "But, when you look at 
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her everybody says, 'Look, you' re talking nonsense! ' They don't 
believe what I'm going through" (Michael A., AD caregiver. First 
interview, 10 June 1992). 
This questioning of the authenticity of AD caregivers' 
experiences led to them developing an enhanced sensi ti vi ty of and 
vigilance toward the reactions and perceptions of people with 
whom they came into contact. For some, this led to the adoption 
of an abrupt and defensive posture toward others. For instance, 
Paul C. was hesitant when discussing his experiences with the 
researcher, and the implicit message was 'ask your questions and 
then leave'. For others, it cued intense attempts to convince 
people of the 'reality' of their experiences, as did Karen N., 
who in the first interview (before even hearing why the 
researcher was interested in her story), began to speak of her 
concern about the impression that the AD "patient gives towards 
the outsider". The researcher found this comment interesting, 
because she had been speaking to Karen's husband while waiting 
for Karen to arrive for the interview. It was as though Karen 
had been carefully scanning the researcher's responses to 
ascertain whether once again the validity of her experiences 
would be questioned, and taking steps to ensure that her 
experiences would be verified by the researcher. She thus 
proceeded to describe her husband's behaviour and the type of 
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person he was both in the past and in the present in her attempt 
to convince the researcher of the reality of her husband's 
illness: 
There is one thing that is very worrying to a 
caregiver, and that is the impression that the patient 
gives towards the outsider. They are very good 
actors, and you know, they can put up a front; 
especially a person like Mr N. He was brilliant. I 
mean he was a school teacher. He was deputy principal 
of a high school, head of science, head of geography, 
taught all the rugby etcetera, etcetera ... And he was 
a laypreacher in the church. So, you know, his 
ability to express himself makes it difficult for the 
outsider to understand that there is actually 
something wrong ... It makes me angry inside, because 
you know, people think that I'm bluffing. (First 
interview, 3 June 1992) 
Karen then told a story of how her husband had got lost whilst 
on an outing with other senior citizens to the Southgate Mall, 
to illustrate the torturous path she had to travel before others 
would acknowledge that her husband was ill and that she was not 
"bluffing". 
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People's responses to AD also seem to be shaped by the fact 
that the cause of AD is uncertain~ For example, Paul c. said 
that his wife's illness is "frightening the hell" out of his 
daughters, because his "wife's brother had the same problem, so 
they worry that it's genetic" (First interview, 25 July 1992). 
Damage and Destruction 
The overall impression gained from the caregivers' 
narratives, was that of worlds - personal and social - devastated 
by the potent influence of AD and stroke. Lipowski (1979) 
identifies five categories of personal meanings of illness -
illness as an enemy, as a weakness, as punishment, as loss or 
damage, and as a challenge. All the caregivers seem to have 
experienced the chronic illness of their spouses as loss or 
damage, hence the emphasis in their descriptions of their 
spouses's positive attributes prior to the illness, which in 
certain cases led to outright romanticisation. For example, 
Mary X. described her husband as a "wizard" and "an absolute 
genius with figures" prior to his stroke: 
He was a bookmaker and he was a wizard, a genius with 
figures and money and quick, but so quick. You can't 
believe itl I mean he didn't need a calculator. He 
would just look and work out percentages. He was an 
absolute genius with figures and now he doesn't even 
know what a cent is or a rand is. Money is ... So, 
you know, one day he was doing what they call a 
settling of R20 000 and the next day it's all gone. 
(First interview, 28 April 1992) 
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Karen N. described her husband as "meticulous" before the onset 
of his illness (AD) and, although he had "always remained a 
gentleman", was "a completely different man to the man (she) 
married": 
He was meticulous. He is a completely different man 
to the man I married. I don't know this man at all! 
The only thing that I am grateful for is he is never 
nasty. He has never become aggressive. He has always 
remained a gentleman, which I am terribly grateful 
for. (Second interview, 4 September 1993) 
Michael A., whose wife is an AD patient, described how his wife's 
ability to "play a wonderful game of tennis" and "a lovely game 
of bridge" had "just faded away" as the illness has progressed: 
"She used to play a wonderful game of tennis. She used to play 
a lovely game of bridge. All that has just faded away. 
All in the last two years" (Michael A., AD caregiver. First 
interview, 10 June 1992). 
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However, when illness is seen as punishment, Lipowski (1979) 
points out that emotional reactions may reflect passive 
resignation and angry depression. For example, Karen N. spoke 
at considerable length during the second interview about problems 
she was experiencing with her children and seemed angry and 
depressed when she questioned whether the suffering she was 
experiencing in relation to her husband's illness could be due 
to 'mistakes' she had made in the past concerning her children: 
"I just wonder with myself. Am I being punished for all these 
things?" (Second interview, 4 September 1993). 
Accommodation 
Caregivers' lives, like those of the patients, were 
drastically altered by the damaging effects of these illnesses. 
For some caregivers accommodation to the aftermath of the illness 
was sudden, and for others it was a gradual process. Paul C., 
whose wife is an AD patient found he had to "curtail his 
activities" and that he became "more and more housebound" as the 
illness progressed: 
My wife used to be a very vital person and a very 
important partner in my life - both business and 
social - and now of course, with this onset of this 
disease, she is quite incapable of making any 
contribution to anything. And, whereas she was an 
exquisite cook and a great hostess, these things have 
all gone. Not quite so bad as the fact that with her 
problems she's very unhappy if I am away, and it's 
not always that easy to be here all the time, with the 
result is one's got to curtail your activities. One 
becomes more and more housebound as time goes on. In 
addition, of course, you can't carry on any 
intelligent conversation. There's nothing at all! 
(Paul C., AD caregiver. First interview, 25 July 
1992) 
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Paul's description exemplifies the gradual accommodation the AD 
caregiver has to make as the disease progresses. By contrast, 
and consistent with Rolland's (1988) distinction between the 
immediate accommodation necessary in the case of stroke and the 
gradual accommodation in the case of AD, Mary X's account of the 
impact that her husband's stroke had upon her life illustrates 
the sudden accommodation she had to make when the stroke 
occurred: 
I was the secretary of a very big fund-raising 
organization. I ran the whole organization and I 
worked very, very hard. In fact it was beginning to 
get too much, because I was doing everything - the 
transport, the fund-raising, the everything ... I only 
worked in the morning •.. I sort of did what I had to 
do and came home at four o' clock and did my cooking 
and whatever .•. In one day my whole life changed. I 
had to stop work instantly! He wouldn't stay in the 
nursing home. He carried on so much there, because he 
didn't know where he was! (Mary X., stroke caregiver. 
First interview, 28 April 1992) 
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Common to both Paul's and Mary's accounts is the loss of freedom 
they experienced as a result of the demands placed on them by the 
patients. In Mary's case, these demands were of such a nature 
that she had to immediately give up her job, whereas Paul could 
continue to pur_sue his interests and gradually "curtail" them as 
his wife's disease progressed to render her increasingly 
incapacitated. 
In addition to changes in their behaviour and social 
patterns, caregivers' narratives also suggested the degree to 
which their world views were confirmed during the illness course. 
According to Sluzki (1983), each of us interacts with our 
environment according to a privately held world view, which 
organises "raw reality" and serves as the basis for perception, 
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the attribution of meaning and action. For instance, during the 
first interview with Ann z., it was evident that her belief that 
each individual within a family should be independent and have 
"their own space to do their own thing" was confirmed during the 
period of her husband's illness: 
I think the whole thing is I'm not used to this 
clinging, because before his stroke he pretty well 
went his way, I went my way, and with having only one 
child I was terrified that I would make her a clinging 
child. So, I made her frightfully independent and so, 
of course, she also did her own thing. So, it was a 
case of three people living in the same house - we had 
lots in common and we did things together - but at the 
same time everyone had their own space to do their own 
thing. And, now I have this clinging, which I never 
had even with a child ... I find it extremely 
irritating ... I'm very much in favour of making 
children independent and ... they've got to make their 
own decisions and when they make the wrong decisions 
they've got to take the consequences. So, this 
clinging drives me scatty1 (First interview, 5 June 
1992) 
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Thus, the more Ann experienced her husband's dependent behaviour 
as "clinging", the more determined she was that she was not going 
to compromise her own personal time: 
He didn't like it at first, but I said to him, "When 
I go upstairs I don't want to hear of you". I don't 
care what he wants, he can wait! There's got to be 
some cut-off point at which that is my time and I'm 
not going to be interrupted. (First interview, 5 June 
1992) 
Entrapment 
Implicit in caregivers' descriptions of the extent to which 
they have had to accommodate to these illnesses are feelings of 
entrapment and helplessness. While Peter D. was able to maintain 
some sense of agency and mastery over the situation when his wife 
was in hospital after her first stroke, her return home left 
"nothing else" for him to do, creating a sense of entrapment and 
futility: 
There's no two ways about that - things have changed 
considerably. I mean, you know, from the very first 
day she's had that stroke it's a case of going to the 
hospital, visiting her in hospital, coming home, going 
back ... But it has sort of changed my life a lot in 
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that there's nothing else I can do. There's nowhere 
I can go, nothing I can do (Peter D., stroke 
caregiver. First interview, 24 July 1992) 
This theme of entrapment was elaborated by Mary X. , who described 
how her husband's dependence pervaded even the most intimate 
recesses of her life-world: 
RESEARCHER: 
MARY: 
RESEARCHER: 
MARY: 
RESEARCHER: 
MARY: 
He's very dependent on you? 
But utterly and completely! 
So it must have been quite difficult for 
you, because you were quite free in the 
sense that you had your job and you could 
get in your car and do your own thing? 
Correct. And he used to do his own thing. 
And now suddenly you have been flung 
together. You have to be together all the 
time. 
Twenty-four hours a day! The only time I 
have is like on a Tuesday. I do a grocery 
order for myself and my daughter, and I 
can't let him sit at the shop 'cos it takes 
over an hour, so my maid comes and she stays 
here ... When I go to a shop I know he's 
sitting outside, so I'm rushing to get out. 
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When I go to the bath, he says: "Don't be 
long!" When I go to the toilet (he says): 
"Don't be long!" I mean he's like my 
shadow. He' s like a Siamese twin. (Mary X, 
stroke caregiver. First interview, 28 April 
1992) 
The loss of freedom and resulting experience of entrapment 
is highlighted by caregivers' use of metaphors. Mary's 
description of her husband's dependence on her ("shadow", 
"Siamese twin" ) vividly portrayed the extent to which her freedom 
has been compromised by his illness, and Ann z., described how 
she felt like a "prisoner" in her own home: "But, you get to a 
point where you feel that you're a prisoner in your own home" 
(Stroke caregiver. First interview, 5 June 1992). 
Multiple Problems 
Whether an illness necessitates instantaneous accommodation 
(as in stroke) or progressive accommodation (as in AD), the 
restructuring of caregivers' lives is not a static event. During 
the year between the first and second interviews, two of the 
stroke caregivers' spouses had experienced further strokes, 
necessitating that once again these caregivers restructure 
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their lives in an attempt to create some order from this further 
fragmentation. For instance, Ann z. found that she had to employ 
a nurse during the day, and Peter D. decided to employ nurses to 
look after his wife both during the day and night until she 
experienced a third, fatal stroke. Thus, the restructuring of 
caregivers' lives is an ongoing process, which is reflexively 
shaped by the course of the illness. 
The events of everyday life, such as financial obligations 
and the problems which arise in daily life, also contribute to 
this restructuring process. For example, caregivers are often 
solely responsible for making financial decisions, a situation 
at times in stark contrast to the shared earning and decision 
making that preceded the illness: 
He planned no finances, no policies, no insurance, no 
nothing. I had to start from scratch ... I've had to 
work, because his income is, you know, being medically 
retired before time and ag, it was before the new 
dispensation etcetera. So we lost out terribly 
financially. (Karen N., AD caregiver. First 
interview, 3 June 1992) 
Cynthia P. described that she would "worry a great deal", because 
she was the "sole breadwinner for two people", but that she had 
decided to "get on with it and do the best" she could: 
I worry about the future, because I'm the sole 
breadwinner for two people (my son who is not working, 
and my husband). So I worry a great deal, but to a 
large extent I have now decided that worrying is not 
going to help me. I must just get on with it and do 
the best I can. (AD caregiver. First interview, 8 
July 1992) 
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In addition to caregivers being solely responsible for 
making financial decisions, they often have to face other 
difficulties and illnesses which occur in their family systems. 
For instance, Cynthia P. spoke of the fact that her oldest 
son has a "drug-induced schizophrenia", and during the first 
interview with Mary X., she spoke of her one daughter's traumatic 
divorce and her other daughter's hysterectomy. In the second 
interview (17 months later) Mary described the "rough time" she 
had had since the first interview: 
I've just had a rough time. My son-in-law had a 
double hernia operation and a week later he had a 
heart attack. He is only 50! A week after that he 
had to have a triple-bypass ... And we got a terrible 
shock with my son. He collapsed (he lives in England) 
and, to cut a long story short, they did brain scans 
and they found something on the brain. I tell you, I 
have been going quite beserk. (Mary X, stroke 
caregiver. Second interview, 11 September 1993) 
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In order to protect her husband from this "terrible shock", 
because she believed "he would completely go to pieces" and 
"would have had another stroke", Mary decided to "hide 
everything" from him by adopting different roles which were alien 
to her 'real' self: "I became the proverbial liar and an 
actress, because when I heard it I could not stop crying. So, 
I would go in the bathroom and cry, come out and put a big grin 
on my face" (Second interview, 11 September 1993). However, Mary 
believed that she herself was being shielded from her son's 
illness by her children, who kept "as much as possible away" from 
her. It worried her to be "in the dark", because she would 
"rather know the worst" than experience anxiety as a result of 
the uncertainty. Although Mary seemed to play a central role 
within her family, she explained that her "whole life revolves 
around" her husband: 
Like in the morning, the first thing he says to me is 
"What are we doing today? and I cannot say, 
"Nothing", so what I do is I plan. I try and plan a 
week in advance, so I'd say, "Well, we're going here 
today" ... and as I say my whole life revolves around 
him. (Mary X, stroke caregiver. Second interview, 11 
September 1993) 
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The narratives also suggested that unresolved conflicts 
experienced with children in the past may be re-ignited during 
the course of a chronic illness. For example, Karen N. spoke of 
her adopted daughter's "basic mistrust" of her and the difficulty 
she has communicating with her adopted son about her husband: 
He has got an answer to everything - some very logical 
answers too. I am actually scared. I am scared to 
open my mouth. I get twisted round in little circles. 
Even when I know I am right - inwardly - but he will 
make me feel that I am totally wrong. (AD caregiver. 
Second interview, 4 September 1993) 
Thus, it is clear that what evolved during the various 
interviews were not merely accounts of discrete illness 
experiences, but stories of lives in which the illness itself had 
become an integral aspect of the caregivers' lives: 
The trajectory of chronic illness assimilates to a 
life course, contributing so intimately to the 
development of a particular life that illness becomes 
inescapable from life history. (Kleinman, 1988b, p. 8) 
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Summary 
Discussion of the structure of the narratives, caregivers' 
illness language and various themes which emerged - such as, 
disconnection, multiple problems, authenticity and uncertainty -
has highlighted similarities and differences in caregivers' 
experiences. This has enabled one to look through the narrative 
window and thereby gain some perspective on the damage and 
destruction of caregivers' lives by chronic illness, and the 
"terribly, terribly lonely" and complex nature of the caregiving 
process. Although this analysis reveals that similarities in 
caregivers' experiences outweigh differences, a prominent theme 
that evolved in AD caregivers' stories - authenticity - unveils 
an important difference between AD and stroke caregivers' 
experiences. During the initial stages of AD, caregiving 
spouses' observations are not only disbelieved or minimised by 
family members and friends, but are ignored by health 
professionals. Consequently, they struggle along in their day-
to-day lives, amidst feelings of uncertainty and confusion 
regarding their ill spouse's behaviour. The implications of this 
for professional care are discussed in Chapter Eight. 
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CHAPTER 7 
COGNITIVE REPARATION: ATTEMPTS TO MEND THE DAMAGE 
The identification and discussion of themes in Chapter Six 
dealt primarily with caregivers' accounts of how family 
boundaries and social interaction patterns were influenced by 
stroke and AD. In this chapter the focus is on conceptual 
changes and caregivers' attempts at repairing the damage 
experienced during the course of these illnesses. More 
specifically, explanatory models constructed in response to 
numerous questions regarding the illness and its treatment, and 
the extent to which these models were shaped by encounters with 
health professionals, community-based organizations and the 
media, is explored. 
Explanatory Models 
During the course of chronic illness, explanatory accounts 
are constructed by patients and their relatives in response to 
a number of different questions they have regarding the various 
aspects of illness and treatment. In Chapter Four, the concept 
of EMs was discussed and it was argued that they "are essential 
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for the more immediate tactics of tacking through the rough seas 
of chronic illness" (Kleinman, 1988b, p.48). The degree to which 
EMs provide the cognitive structure in which illness experiences 
are contained and dealt with, is now investigated. 
Cause 
Stroke caregivers . Al though Peter D. , Mary X. , and Ann Z . 
provided medical explanations for the cause of their spouses' 
strokes, they also provided their own personal explanations for 
these events. Peter explained that his wife had high blood 
pressure and regretted that this was not detected sooner -
"Actually I think that was a problem which we didn't discover 
early enough" (First interview, 24 July 1992). Later during the 
first interview, he attributed the occurrence of stroke to "the 
pace of life today" and explained that it is for this same reason 
that he "takes things in (his) stride": 
Actually it's the pace of life today which is bringing 
it on all the time. It's the pace of life. That's 
why I say I'm glad to a point that I sort of take 
things in my stride and don't worry what's going to 
happen in 10 years time or in 5 years time, or even 
tomorrow. (First interview, 24 July 1992) 
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Mary X. explained that her husband's stroke was due to a "clot" 
and that the doctors wanted to operate on his carotid artery 
"because they reckon that that's 'where the clots =ire coming 
(from)". However, she believed he would not have survived the 
operation, and inferring from their diagnosis that the root cause 
was "thick blood", attempted to rather "keep his blood fairly 
thin" by using her "common sense with the Warfarin": 
They wanted to do an angiogram and they wanted to 
operate on his carotid artery. But he was ... there 
was just no way that he could ever, ever have survived 
that operation. My house-doctor still says he should 
have it done. But, I mean he would never cope with 
it. I know he could never cope with it! •.. But, I 
feel, you know, I'm keeping his blood fairly thin. 
(First interview, 28 April 1992) 
Apart from Mary's medical explanation for her husband's stroke, 
she believed that her husband had a stroke, because "some idiot" 
told him that if he did not take his medication he would feel 
"like a new person" and being a "soft person" he stopped 
taking his tablets: 
Some idiot - because you know, he is a very soft sort 
of a person and you can talk him into anything - said 
to him, "You know, if you threw away all your 
medicines like me, you would feel like a new person". 
So, I used to give him his medicine and as I turned my 
back, he would put it in his pocket and that was when 
he had a proper stroke! (First interview, 28 April 
1992) 
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Ann z. also explained that her husband's stroke was caused by a 
"clot", "because if he had had a hemorrhage he would have had 
different symptoms". However, she felt that her husband blamed 
her for his illness, and in turn she blamed him, because she 
believed that "he has been harbouring things for years" and by 
doing that had made himself ill: 
I think it might be common with stroke people - I 
don't know what you found - but they try and blame 
someone for having had the stroke. Now as far as I am 
concerned, he is responsible for his stroke - nobody 
else - and if he wants to get bettter it is up to him. 
Nobody can do it for him. You know, I can do much, 
but in the end that is all I can do. I think he 
blames me. (Second interview, 4 September 1993) 
Ann then elaborated on her theory that if you "harbour things for 
years ... you can make yourself sick", as follows: 
And when you build up all these resentments, I don't 
see how your body can work with all these closed 
circuits ... all these things blocking up inside, 
because as far as I am concerned, the brain is rather 
like an electrical system and if the messages aren't 
getting through, something has got to give ... And I 
think these resentments built up through his life 
from a young child, and never talking to anybody about 
it (Second interview, 4 September 1993) 
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Ann has attempted to confirm this theory by speaking to other 
wives whose husbands are stroke patients, and discovered other 
explanations for the cause of stroke, such as "violent temper": 
I've tried to talk to some of the other wives about 
how their husbands were before. The one woman said 
her husband had the most violent temper before he had 
the stroke and it was the temper that finally gave him 
the stroke, but since the stroke he has calmed down 
completely. (Second interview, 4 September 1993) 
Ann's causal explanation for stroke is similar to that of other 
wives, because both explanations concern 'pressure' and its 
control. However, at another level these explanations differ in 
that Ann attributes the cause of stroke to a build up of internal 
'pressure', whereas other wives believe that stroke is caused by 
the release of too much 'pressure'. Ann believed that her 
husband had a stroke, because he had built up resentments over 
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the years and had not spoken to anyone about them. Thus, she 
believed the internal 'pressure' created by this build up and the 
fact that this 'pressure' was not released, led to her husband's 
stroke. Other wives believed that stroke is caused by a violent 
temper. This suggests that inadequate, internal control of 
emotions, and hence frequent release of too much 'pressure' 
through rage outbursts, causes stroke. 
Thus, although medical explanations have been incorporated 
into these stroke caregivers' EMs, it is evident that they have 
their own personal explanations about what caused their spouse's 
stroke. The theme of blame was prominent in their explanations: 
Peter seemed to blame both himself and the doctors for not 
discovering "early enough" that his wife had high blood pressure, 
Mary blamed her husband for being "soft" and listening to an 
"idiot", and Ann blamed her husband for "harbouring things for 
years". 
AD caregivers. Although the theme of blame was less 
prominent in AD caregivers' explanations, Cynthia P. held her 
husband responsible for "letting himself get so sick" and was 
angry and bitter when she spoke of the fact that she "grieves" 
for herself more than she does for him: 
I just grieve for the state of my life now. I am 
cross with him for letting himself get so sick, 
because all his life - you can see all his books here 
- he has always maintained that ... you control your 
mind. Whatever you - he was a Freudian, absolutely -
and whatever you wanted. Now I'm sitting - "And so 
what are you letting yourself get like this for? 
Where's your mind now?" (First interview, 8 July 
1992) 
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The scientific uncertainty as to the cause of AD was replicated 
in AD caregivers explanations. Nevertheless, it was clear 
that their EMs, like those of the stroke caregivers, involved 
both medical explanations and their own personal theories. For 
example, Michael A. attributed the onset of his wife's illness 
to the death of his son: 
I lost a son three years ago, four years ago. She 
hasn't shed a tear. I think that must have started it 
in her brain, you see. You know, if you keep it in, 
keep it in. She doesn't mention his name. (First 
interview, 10 June 1992) 
Later in the interview, he provided a 'medical' explanation for 
his wife's symptoms: 
She had two CAT scans and they found out she's got a 
little spasm in the brain - a little space - and as 
soon as it touches that space, she'll go off the deep 
end. Then she'll say, "Get out the house". How many 
times she has chased me out the house. (First 
interview, 10 June 1992) 
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Michael's belief that "if you keep it (grief) in" it is likely 
to affect you, is similar to Ann z 's belief that "if you harbour 
things ... you can make yourself ill" and suggests that 
AD and stroke caregivers may share the very common belief that 
if people do not express their emotions, they are likely to 
experience these illnesses. Paul C. believed that AD is most 
likely due to "stress", which is similar to Peter D's belief that 
the occurrence of stroke is due to "the pace of life today". 
This suggests that "stress" might also be a causal explanation 
shared by stroke and AD caregivers. 
The idea that the pressure and stresses of modern life cause 
illness can be traced back to 1897 when the famous physician, Sir 
William Osler, warned that the worry and strain of modern life, 
and the high pressure at which men live, caused 'arterial 
degeneration'. This fear of modernity, and its effect on the 
heart was once again evident when the cardiologists, Friedman and 
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Rosenman (1959) proposed the Type A and Type B model of human 
behaviour. This model was constructed to explain the rising 
incidence of coronary heart disease, and it was proposed that the 
Type A individual was more prone to suffering from heart disease 
than the Type B individual. Friedman and Rosenman (1959) 
described the six core features of the Type A Behaviour Pattern 
as follows: (a) An intense, sustained drive to achieve self-
selected but usually poorly defined goals, (b) a profound 
eagerness to compete, ( c) a persistent desire for recognition and 
advancement, (d) a continuous involvement in 'multiple and 
diverse functions' constantly subject to deadlines, (e) a 
tendency to accelerate the rate of many physical and mental 
functions, and (f) an extraordinary mental and physical 
alertness. By contrast, the Type B individual is described as 
a relaxed, laid-back, friendly and non-competitive person, who 
is satisfied with his status and a life centred mainly on the 
circle of his family and friends (Helman, 1991, p. 127). 
Helman ( 1991) points out that in the USA heart disease still 
has its own symbolic significance, and has even acquired its own 
mythology: "In our modern minds, heart attacks have a 
relationship to what we do, as if we bring them upon ourselves" 
(p. 136). Analysis of caregivers' causal explanations for stroke 
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and AD indicates that these ilnesses have also acquired their own 
mythology, because caregivers' constructions indicate that they 
believe that their ill spouses brought these illnesses upon 
themselves; patients themselves are responsible for their 
suffering. 
Unlike the other caregivers, Karen N. did not appear to have 
her own personal theory about the cause of her husband's illness, 
and her explanations drew upon what she knew about research into 
the causes of AD. While speaking about theories, she seemed to 
favour the idea that AD is hereditary, because she believed that 
her mother-in-law had AD and that this would explain her 
husband's illness: 
I don't know if it is something we have done wrong in 
our early years. Lots of people have said that 
cooking in aluminium pots - but how many millions of 
people cooked in aluminium pots? Until that is sort 
of proven definitely, who is to say? I really don't 
know, and I think there is a certain amount of 
hereditary aspect to the thing, because Mr N's mom, I 
am sure, had Alzheimers. She was very strange, and 
definitely senile. (Second interview, 4 September 
1993) 
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Encounters with medical practitioners 
While explaining their beliefs about the cause of their 
spouses' illnesses, caregivers also described their encounters 
with medical practitioners. In Chapter One, I discussed the fact 
that Ann z. and Cynthia P. felt disqualified and unsupported by 
the doctors whom they consulted, and that they felt frustrated 
at not being able to breach the barrier between them and these 
medical professionals. However, all the caregivers, not only 
Cynthia and Ann, described their encounters with medical 
practitioners in negative terms. 
The AD caregivers appeared to be frustrated by the fact that 
doctors "know nothing" about the illness. For example, Paul C. 
was irritated by the conflicting information he received from 
different doctors and needed their "encouragement", but did not 
receive that either: 
They know nothing about it and they just guess - can't 
give any help at all. They give no encouragement 
either. They know nothing about it ... I think you 
get three doctors - one says this, another says it 
might be and another says it's going to be. (First 
interview, 25 July 1992) 
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Karen N. experienced the neurologist she went to as being "very 
blunt", and Michael A. was exasperated by the fact that "you 
don't get anybody here that can advise you. You go to the doctor 
I've spoken to three specialists and my doctors and they say, 
'We don't know!'" (First interview, 10 June 1992). 
The stroke caregivers described the impersonal nature of 
their contact with specialists and doctors, as follows: 
RESEARCHER: Did you have regular contact with your GP ? 
PETER: 
RESEARCHER: 
PETER: 
RESEARCHER: 
PETER: 
No. At Millpark it was always the 
specialist. Our GP never even came near me 
after she had the stroke. I put her in 
-hospital and that was the last time he 
worried about her. 
Very impersonal. 
It was. Even when I called him it was a bit 
of a job to get him, although, eventually, 
when I did ask him to come, he would come 
without too much of an argument. But to 
start with he was not all that helpful. 
And the specialists? How did you find them? 
Well, the one specialist that she was under 
at Millpark Hospital, I don't know, I hardly 
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ever saw him really. Every time I bumped 
into him he would give me a bit of 
information, but nothing more. And that was 
that. He would just give me information of 
how she was getting on or if she was not 
getting on, but further than that - nothing! 
(Second interview, 11 September 1993) 
Analysis of the narratives reveals that in addition to 
caregivers requiring explanations for their spouses' illnesses, 
they need advice, encouragement and understanding during the 
consultation. Furthermore, they need the practitioner to 
show ongoing concern and support during the course of the 
illness. Ann Z. explained how she thought that if her husband's 
neurosurgeon was a "concerned doctor", he would have "picked up 
the 'phone and said, 'I did not see him for a check-up. How is 
he?'"(First interview, 5 June 1992). Based on the "churlish 
treatment" she experienced from the neurosurgeon, and the "off-
hand" manner of the neurosurgeons in general, Ann decided she 
would rather take her husband to their GP for future check-ups. 
She explained that her GP "seldom keeps (them) waiting", would 
always "fit (her husband) in" when he did not have an appointment 
and that she could "rely on Dr G. at any time". 
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Mary X. said that although the hospital staff were "very nice", 
she found that there was not "that personal care" and "each time 
you go you see another doctor". Therefore, rather than sitting 
"at casualty for hours and hours" she would take her husband to 
have a check-up with their "house-doctor" once a year. In their 
search to understand and cope with their spouses' illnesses, it 
appears that caregivers' were largely frustrated by encounters 
with medical practitioners. Due to futile attempts at dissolving 
barriers between themselves and different practitioners they 
approached Stroke Aid or ARDA in the hope that these 
organizations would be of help to them. Thus, their experiences 
as members of Stroke Aid or ARDA were elicited to determine to 
what extent membership of these organizations satisfied their 
needs. AD caregivers tended to be negative about their 
experiences at ARDA support group meetings, whereas stroke 
caregivers were more favourable toward Stroke Aid. 
Alzheimer's and Related Disorders Association 
AD caregivers, Michael A. and Karen N., believed that 
support group meetings "are not always the answer", because there 
was too much diversity in these groups and that the groups were 
"a bit big". They explained that groups included not only AD 
caregivers, but also caregivers of people with related disorders, 
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such as Parkinson's disease. Furthermore, both children and 
spouses are included in the same group: 
Each one's got a different thing entirely. This one 
talks about Parkinson's and this - if I had to talk 
and say something it would mean nothing to them, 
because it doesn't help them. Neither does it help 
me, because they can't help me and we're all in the 
same boat; we're about 10 or 12 of us. (Michael A. 
First interview, 10 June 1992) 
Michael explained later during the interview that support group 
meetings provided an opportunity to "get away from it all" and 
to express his feelings, but was dissatisfied because he needed 
advice and "they can't give advice": 
But, they do nothing for you. Their mother doesn't 
say hello to them, she doesn't recognise them. So, 
they come to these meetings to get away from it all 
... we have a gathering. It's an outing. I can 
express my feelings in front of everybody, but they 
can't give me advice, and neither can I give them 
advice. (First interview, 10 June 1992) 
Karen N. also found the composition of groups too diverse, as 
well as stifling h~r needs to talk and be heard: 
But you know they are not always the answer. I have 
been going to this group for many years ... The group 
- I think it is a bit big for one thing - they used to 
break up into married couples or children and parents 
... now it is just mixed ... One woman dominated the 
entire meeting with her own problems ... There is no 
control ..• Instead of saying, "Listen, let the other 
people have a chance. " (Second interview, 4 September 
1993) 
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Like Karen N., Cynthia P. felt frustrated by the fact that "one 
or two persons dominate the group" and believed that the group 
leader could not "cope with it" and "was not trained in any way 
for this sort of work": 
We have one somewhat hysterical woman in our group. 
She spoils the whole tone ... She should be shut up 
nicely and let other people also get on with - but she 
laughs and she's got this hysterical, you know, and 
the group leader doesn't cope with it The 
therapist should be able to say, "Let's hear. Look, 
here's a new person". Now and then we have a new 
person who doesn't have a chance to speak. (Cynthia P. 
Second interview, 9 September 1993) 
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Cynthia explained that because she is "inclined to be a bit 
bossy" she would "sometimes sort of interfere" when frustrated 
by the situation: "I am inclined to be a bit bossy ... I 
sometimes sort of interfere, because I cannot stand being 
frustrated. There we have got a new person and I sometimes say, 
'Why don't we hear what S. has got to say?.'" (Second interview, 
9 September 1993). Nevertheless, Cynthia spoke of the fact that 
it was "pleasant to just get away for an hour" and described her 
experiences with various members of her group: 
But it is still, as I think it is for all of us, 
pleasant to just get away for an hour, pleasant to 
hear that everyone has the same problems ... There are 
definitely friendships. I have become quite friendly 
with one of the ladies. We went out a few weeks ago -
she and her husband and mine. It was pleasant. And, 
there are some that I can't stomach - I keep away from 
- because they irritate me and I am sure it works like 
that in groups. (Second interview, 9 S '?tember 1993) 
Apart from requiring that the group leader take control and allow 
more members to contribute at each meeting, Cynthia believed that 
she could benefit from "some sort of intellectual stimulation". 
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However, by saying this she did not mean that she needed 
educational input, because she felt she was an 'expert' on AD: 
What I would like with the support groups is guest 
lecturers - people who can give one some sort of 
intellectual stimulation ... Not educational. I know 
everything there is to know about Alzheimer's. I have 
read every note. But, just a doctor, a neurologist, 
a psychiatrist, somebody who's got some fresh ideas; 
who speaks well. It would be nice. (Second interview, 
9 September 1993) 
Like Michael A. and Karen N., Paul C. also implied that 
support groups have limited value for caregivers, because "all 
they can do is give some sort of back-up support", and he 
described how it was "quite frightening" to meet caregivers who 
were dealing with patients in "more advanced" stages of the 
illness: 
Well, I think all they can do is give some sort of 
back-up support, that's all. I mean encouragement and 
you hear other people having the same problems you're 
having and, uh, well, it's also quite frightening, 
because you meet people who are far more advanced and 
it gets to worry one a bit. (First interview, 25 July 
1992) 
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Despite feeling negative or neutral about support group 
meetings, caregivers continued to attend such meetings. Both 
Michael A. and Cynthia P. construed this as an opportunity 
to "get away" from the dull routine of their daily lives, and 
to identify with others who were "in the same boat" as them. 
Nevertheless, they concurred that the utility of support group 
meetings would be enhanced if group leaders considered a number 
of factors. Firstly, group leaders should offer practical advice 
about how caregivers could provide care for patients. Secondly, 
group leaders should create opportunities during group meetings 
for all caregivers to contribute to the discussion. Caregivers 
also believed that they could benefit from intellectual 
stimulation, such as lectures by health professionals. Finally, 
caregivers' stated that groups should be small and homogenous. 
In other words, there should be separate groups for spouses and 
children. 
Stroke Aid 
Stroke caregivers' experiences of their contact with Stroke 
Aid seemed to be more favourable than AD caregivers' experiences 
of ARDA. Ann z., Peter D., and Mary x. spoke of the benefit 
their spouses derived from occupational therapy and physiotherapy 
provided by Stroke Aid. Although Mary acknowledged that her 
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husband had benefited from therapy at Stroke Aid, she compared 
the general lack of facilities for stroke care in South Africa 
with the more abundant facilities available in the USA: 
Oh, that Stroke Aid is wonderful, but it is only one 
morning a week. He enjoys it and they are actually 
giving them something to do ... They sort of give them 
what they call brainteasers. Look, some he can cope 
with, some he can't, but he likes it there. You see, 
unfortunately in this country there isn't a single -
like they have Stroke Aid - that's it! There's 
nothing in this country! In America they've got these 
clinics in every suburb, day clinics, hour clinics, 
which is absolutely wonderful. Psychologists, 
psychiatrists, but there's nothing here. There's 
absolutely nothing for this type of condition. (Mary 
X. First interview, 28 April 1992) 
Thus, although Mary believed that Stroke Aid was a "wonderful" 
organization and that her husband had benefited from the therapy 
they provided, it was clear that she believed that the services 
provided by Stroke Aid were limited and insufficient compared to 
those available in the USA. During the second interview she 
spoke again about the fact that her husband had benefited from 
the therapy provided by Stroke Aid, because "he's with others in 
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the same situation, so he doesn't feel inferior; he doesn't feel 
inadequate", and she still felt it was "a pity" that meetings 
were held only once a week. 
Ann z. spoke of how Stroke Aid has served different 
functions during the course of her husband's rehabilitation. 
Initially he attended the weekly meeting for physiotherapy, but 
later Ann made use of this opportunity to have time for herself: 
Now we go for a different reason, because I wasn't 
getting any time at all on my own. So now, I leave 
him there at half past nine and I pick him up at 
twelve o' clock. So, that gives me those couple of 
hours on a Tuesday morning. (First interview, 5 June 
1992) 
Peter D. mentioned that he found Stroke Aid "very_good" in 
helping him cope with his wife's illness, because they gave him 
practical ideas of how to help her and offered their impressions 
of his wife's condition which helped him to verify observations 
he had made: 
Stroke Aid are very good. I like them. That lady she 
goes to is very helpful with her and she gives me 
ideas of what I should do and what I shouldn't do to 
try and help her along ... And the lady said, you 
know, no, she could see that she was going backwards. 
(First interview, 24 July 1992) 
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Thus, a number of factors seem to have played a role in 
shaping the extent to which caregivers' found Stroke Aid helpful 
in dealing with their spouse's illness: The fact that their 
partners had benefited from therapy, practical advice about how 
to cope with their spouses' impairments, and the opportunity for 
caregivers to have some time for themselves. 
Media 
A common theme to emerge from the caregivers' narratives 
is their need for practical advice about how to cope with their 
spouses' illnesses. However, it is evident that this need was 
met neither in their contact with medical practitioners nor 
during their participation in support group meetings held by 
Stroke Aid and ARDA. Some caregivers therefore relied on other 
sources for this advice, such as books and the radio. 
During the first interview with Mary x., she spoke of "the most 
wonderful book" she had "just read" and that she would "keep 
reading it over" in an effort to cope with the diffculties her 
husband had experienced since his stroke: 
I just read the most wonderful book. It is called The 
36 Hour Day and I've learnt so much about dementia. 
It's all sort of related to one another and I've 
learnt a lot from this book ... and I'll keep reading 
it over. There's lots of things that I've been doing 
that I shouldn't do. You know, he'll say something 
ten times, but you mustn't say, "But I've already told 
you", because he doesn't know that he's even asked you 
the question and you've got to try and change the 
subject. (First interview, 28 April 1992) 
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During the second interview, Mary referred to this book once 
again, and said that she believed it was "the only thing that has 
really helped" her. Thus, although this book is a practical 
guide for AD caregivers, Mary felt it was helpful to her in terms 
of how she should cope with her husband's stroke, because she 
believed her husband's illness was AD's "cousin": 
The only thing that has really helped me, was this 
book .•. What my husband has got is a cousin, I would 
say. I have asked the doctors when they have done his 
brain scans and he definitely has not got Alzheimer's. 
But, his condition is so related to Alzheimer's in so 
many aspects. It's quite amazing! (Second interview, 
11 September 1993) 
Michael A. also spoke of a "wonderful book" he received from his 
daughter in the USA, which told him what he should do when caring 
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for his wife who has AD. In fact this book played such an 
important role in assisting him with the day-to-day care of his 
wife that he felt he could not "let it go out of (his) hands": 
This, believe you me, it's a wonderful book. I can't 
let it go out of my hands. You can photostat it if 
you want Sometimes something happens and I want to 
refer to it. So, right away it's a reference. They 
give examples here. Like my wife won't bath and they 
tell you exactly how to bath them. All little things 
- say the person gets annoyed, aggravated. They tell 
you what to do. (First interview, 10 June 1992) 
Other caregivers, such as Ann z., found the radio helpful 
in providing information and giving advice. In Ann's case, it 
was through a radio programme that she heard about Stroke Aid, 
and she was angry that this organization had not been recommended 
to her whilst her husband was in hospital: 
Fortunately I listen to everything on the radio, and 
at some stage they were interviewing somebody from 
Stroke Aid and I took their name and number down in my 
emergency list of people I may need at some stage. 
Now, there again I think at the hospital they should 
have said there is this organization, instead of which 
he was just discharged and they didn't say what I 
should do or what treatment he should have or anything 
like that. (Stroke caregiver. First interview, 5 June 
1992) 
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During the second interview, Ann explained that she taped a 
programme on the radio so that her husband could listen to the 
discussion, because she found that very often he would not listen 
to her, but would listen to somebody else: 
702 get these people in and very often you learn more 
from when people 'phone in and then the speaker gives 
the answer. And, oddly enough, there was someone on 
last night on the David Blood show. I taped it, 
because I have been saying to Mr z. all along, "You 
have to take responsi_bili ty for yourself". I think 
everybody has to. But, here was somebody else - and 
very often what I say is in and out and that's it 
straight through - but when somebody else says it, 
then it makes a difference . ( Stroke caregiver. Second 
interview, 4 September 1993) 
Thus, the media - books and the radio - were used by some 
caregivers' to obtain advice about how to cope with their 
spouses' illnesses, to get in contact with other sources of 
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information and, at times, to convince their ill spouses about 
their beliefs. 
Psychotherapy 
Only two of the seven caregivers, Cynthia P. and Karen N., 
who are both AD caregivers, had experienced psychotherapy. 
Cynthia explained that she had "been seeing a psychologist for 
many years", because her son was diagnosed as suffering from 
schizophrenia, and Karen attended therapy at a local hospital 
during the course of her husband's illness, because she was 
"terribly depressed". Cynthia explained how her therapist had 
framed her husband's illness as having "liberated" her, because 
prior to the illness, he was a "very, very difficult man". 
Cynthia thus distinguished herself from other AD caregivers by 
saying that she was a "rather atypical example", because she did 
not have to "deal with the grief at losing this loved person" 
like others in her group had: 
Mine's a rather atypical example, because I was 
married to a very, very difficult man. He was 
extremely autocratic ... I used to have to plead and 
beg for every cent that I got. So, I had a hard life 
with him •.. I have been seeing a psychologist for 
many years and she put it very succintly. The way she 
describes it, is his illness has liberated me, because 
I'm now the one who holds the purse strings ... By the 
time he got sick I don't think I loved him very much 
any more. So, I notice when we go to the Alzheimer's 
groups, one of the things that a lot of the people 
have to deal with is the grief at losing this loved 
person, you know, this person they so loved. That's 
an emotion I haven't had. So, I don't really grieve. 
(First interview, 8 July 1992) 
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Cynthia's use of the past tense when speaking of her husband 
implies that he is dead, whereas he is still alive. This 
suggests that while the patient is being transformed by the 
disease, so too does the caregiver's conceptualization of the 
patient change. Cynthia no longer believed that her husband was 
difficult or autocratic, and therefore agreed with the 
psychologist's reframe that the illness had "liberated her". 
Thus, in this case the transformation of the patient was 
interpreted in positive terms, whereas in most cases this change 
is usually experienced as traumatic; the "social death" 
experienced by family members in relation to the patient causing 
much heartache and grief. The researcher was curious about 
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whether Cynthia believed she was coping with her husband's 
illness as a consequence of having been in therapy, and explored 
this with her: 
RESEARCHER: 
CYNTHIA: 
So, would you say one of the reasons why 
you're coping is because you've been going 
to therapy for quite a few years and you've 
perhaps learnt to deal with things 
differently and work through them? 
I can't answer you . I can' t answer you . I 
don't know. I don't know whether it's by 
nature of my personality which is somewhat 
dominant. I'm a dominant sort of - I'm not 
a cowering But, the reason I'm coping, 
I think, is because I am a capable person. 
I'm good at the business. I've been able to 
just take it over. (First interview, 8 July 
1992) 
Nevertheless, it was clear during the interviews with Cynthia 
that psychotherapy had had a considerable impact on the way she 
spoke about and explained various experiences. For instance, at 
the end of the first interview when the researcher thanked 
Cynthia for her participation in the study, she spoke of her 
experience of the interview as being "like a catharsis": 
RESEARCHER: 
CYNTHIA: 
RESEARCHER: 
CYNTHIA: 
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So, I'm glad you helped me out. I really 
appreciate it. 
No. It's nice for me too, because when one 
talks you -
You need an outlet. You get a lot off your 
shoulders. 
It's like a catharsis, yes, yes. 
(First interview, 8 July 1992) 
During the second interview, Cynthia also seemed to believe that 
her support group could benefit from the presence of a 
psychologist, because "there was one stage when (she) went to the 
the group that a psychologist came with the group leader" and she 
felt it was a "more meaningful sort of group". Therefore, later 
during the interview, she asked the researcher to attend one of 
their meetings. 
Unlike Cynthia's experience of long-term therapy, Karen's 
therapy was brief, because her therapist had "got her over" her 
desperation "so much so that (she) thought (she) could do without 
his help", and implied that she felt she needed his help once 
again: 
He was extremely good and I was terribly depressed 
There were times I really considered driving to a 
hospital and booking myself in. I was so desperate, 
you know. But, he got me over that. So much so that 
I thought I could do without his help ... But I think 
one needs that sort of therapy sometimes. (Second 
interview, 4 September 1993) 
Summary 
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It is clear from the above discussion that caregivers' 
attempts to repair and reconstruct their lives were hampered by 
their dissatisfactory encounters with medical practitioners and 
by the fact that their needs were not completely met by 
community-based organizations. In addition, their attempts to 
mend their damaged lives were hindered by multiple problems which 
were discussed in Chapter Six. These problems, such as financial 
difficulties and other family members' illnesses, served to shape 
their experiences further. Thus, caregivers' illness experiences 
were not just a function of the illness, but were also influenced 
by social factors. 
In general, consideration of these spouses' constructions 
of the caregiving process depicted it as a mundane, monotonous, 
and grey process. Except for Cynthia P. who constructed her 
experience in terms of a positive reframe provided by her 
therapist ("the way she describes it, is his illness has 
liberated me"), none of the caregivers suggested that the 
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experience of stroke or AD could be perceived as "good" or as a 
"growth experience". Instead, their narratives produced an image 
of decay as they witnessed both the 'decomposition' of their 
spouses and the dilapidation and disintegration of their own 
lives. Nevertheless, the caregivers showed determination and 
perseverance when faced with these various adversities, and 
perhaps it was this strength and determination which helped them 
to survive the ordeal. 
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CHAPTER 8 
EVALUATION OF THE STUDY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE CARE 
A critigue of the study 
In using narrative analysis with the interview responses of 
caregivers' illness experiences, certain advantages and 
disadvantages over more traditional methods, such as the 
questionnaire, were found. 
Disadvantages 
Analysis of oral narratives is a slow process, and therefore 
not a suitable method when there are time constraints. Secondly, 
during the co-construction of caregivers' illness experiences, 
narratives are shaped by the researcher's ideas and are further 
moulded by the researcher during their analysis. For example, 
in this study the researcher identified a number of common 
themes, such as social disconnection, authenticity and 
entrapment. Due to the complex, detailed nature of the stories, 
additional themes may have been overlooked. Furthermore, other 
researchers may have abstracted different themes to those 
identified in this study. 
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The analysis of written biographies is perhaps a more 
appropriate method of narrative analysis when there are time 
limitations, and may reduce the degree to which participants' 
experiences are influenced by the researchers' contributions. 
However, the analysis of written experiences also involves the 
researcher imposing his or her own constructions on the interview 
material during the analytic process. Thus, the findings and 
conclusions derived through narrative analysis are "temporary 
constructions" (Gergen in Antaki, 1988, p. 110) shaped by the 
context of narration and analysis. Findings in this study 
cannot therefore be generalised to all caregivers who are spouses 
of stroke or AD patients. 
Advantages 
In Chapter One, the metaphor of a one-way mirror was used 
to convey the nature of the medical practitioner-patient 
relationship, and it was proposed that through attention to 
caregivers' illness experiences, this mirror could be replaced 
by a window. In other words, rather than health professionals 
focusing on the language of disease and ignoring the language of 
illness, they should consider the illness experiences of patients 
and caregivers. Such consideration may aid diagnosis, reduce the 
occurrence of conflict and encourage the development of more 
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mutual, supportive and empowering relationships between patients 
and professionals. During the interviews, not only was a 
narrative window on AD and stroke caregivers' experiences 
constructed, b'1t the collaborative nature of the interview 
process was respectful of the participants and provided an 
opportunity for them to be heard. According to Viney (1989), 
social scientists often need to take on the role of speaking for 
those who participate in social science research, and especially 
in relation to illness, where the voices of patients are 
relatively rarely heard. In addition to the researcher creating 
a context for caregivers' to voice their experiences, an attempt 
was made to reproduce these experiences in a minimally distorted 
manner. Interpretations which might have negated the 
participants' experiences were therefore avoided. Furthermore, 
the unstructured nature of the interviews enabled the researcher 
to validate caregivers' experiences, because as Kleinman (1988b) 
points out, it is important for the health professional "to 
witness a life story, to validate its interpretation and to 
affirm its value" (p. 50). Thus, caregivers generally evaluated 
the interviews in a positive light, and not as an intrusion. 
This encouraged caregivers to share their intimate thoughts and 
feelings about illness, and resulted in their narratives being 
elaborate and rich in detail. 
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Having discussed some of the advantages and disadvantages 
of narrative analysis, it seems that for studies which aim to 
construct the experience of chronic illness, the advantages of 
this method outweigh the disadvantages . Thus, in future studies 
of chronic illness experiences, this method would be valuable. 
It is important that future research of chronic illness be 
conducted, because chronic illness not only invades the patient's 
life, but consumes the energy and resources of the patient's 
family. Future studies would therefore assist those 
professionals who treat chronic illness to understand the complex 
nature of illness experience, and be more effective in providing 
care. More specifically, medical practitioners need to be 
sensitized to the concepts of illness and disease, and the 
importance of eliciting and witnessing patients' narratives. 
Implications for future care 
The feelings of social disconnection, loss, loneliness and 
depression which emerged in these narratives are only a few 
of the various experiences which could be addressed by health 
professionals, particularly psychotherapists. The discussion of 
the themes in Chapter Six has various implications for 
therapists, because understanding these themes alerts one to 
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significant aspects of caregivers' experiences and thereby 
enables one to make appropriate therapeutic decisions. For 
example, in the case of an AD caregivers' support group, one may 
choose to create a context where participants' stories are 
witnessed, acknowledged, and most importantly, authenticated. 
In the case of a stroke caregivers' support group, the therapist 
may choose to explore the sudden impact that the stroke had on 
participants' lives and elicit ideas about how they could 
restructure their lives. It is hypothesized that gender 
differences would also have implications for how therapists 
conduct group meetings. 
Anderson, Blue and Lau (1991) point out that women's 
experiences cannot be subsumed under those of men, because there 
are specific issues, such as women's roles inside and outside the 
home, which influence a woman's experience of illness. However, 
analysis of the narratives indicates few major differences 
between women and men's caregiving experiences. The most 
significant difference was in the way that men and women spoke 
about their experiences. Male caregivers tended to provide more 
factual descriptions, whereas women portrayed their experiences 
in more vivid, metaphorical terms. For example, Cynthia P. 
described her experience of her husband's behaviour as "like 
having a child tagging along" and explained that "he needs to be 
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looked after like a baby" . Karen N. , whose husband is also •,n 
AD patient, described him as being "like an obedient little puppy 
dog with the mentality of a two year old. Even less, because a 
two year old will give you a bit of lip". Mary X. explained that 
her husband "carried on like a demented animal" in the hospital 
after he had had his stroke and that he was so dependent on her 
that he was "like a Siamese twin". 
Another gender difference which became evident during the 
second interviews, was that women appear more able to sustain and 
persevere with the caregiving role than men who are in the same 
position: Paul C. and his wife moved to Knysna to live with 
their daughter, Michael A. sold his home and moved into an old 
age home with his wife, and Peter D. employed nurses to help him 
care for his wife after she had had a second stroke. In 
comparison, the caregiving wives had made few changes to the 
structure of their lives, and continued to endure alone 
difficulties which arose and the monotony of the caregiving 
process. None of the women had moved home, and Karen N., Mary 
X., and Cynthia P. were still central in their families' 
activities. Although Ann z. employed a day nurse after her 
husband had experienced another stroke, she received no other 
help in caring for him. These differences could be because women 
160 
are more familiar than men with the nurturing role, or because 
this is what is expected of them. A few of the caregivers (such 
as Cynthia P.) seemed to believe that daughters are more 
supportive of the caregiver than sons, who are generally 
uninvolved. However, analysis of the interviews indicates that 
this was not necessarily the case. For instance, Karen N. 
mentioned that her daughter disagreed with her caregiving ideas 
and had a "basic mistrust" of her, and as a result felt she 
did not receive the support she needed from her daughter. In 
fact, the male caregivers seemed to receive considerable help and 
·support from their daughters, whereas women caregivers found that 
their daughters were either largely uninvolved in the caregiving 
process because they had their own lives to lead, or were unable 
to help in the care of their fathers because they lived far away. 
However, there were generally few gender differences which 
could be because these caregivers are elderly and therefore 
accept the occurrence of chronic illness as an inevitable part 
of the ageing process. Although the resounding message is clear 
- "there's no two ways about it, it (chronic illness) changes 
your life dramatically" - the impact of the illnesses on their 
lives is almost certainly less than if the caregivers had still 
been rearing children and attempting to establish careers. 
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However, based on the researcher's recent experiences of 
ARDA support group meetings, most caregivers had never 
contemplated psychotherapy and were unable to distinguish between 
the roles of psychiatrists and psychologists. This suggests that 
chronic illness is an area where the voices of therapists have 
not been heard. This may be due to a preference for more 
'dramatic' problems, such as suicide or sexual abuse, or perhaps 
because the knowledge that chronic illness cannot be cured leads 
to feelings of helplessness and negativity on the part of the 
therapist. 
Of ten when we see devastated families in which a child 
is dying of cancer, or a beloved parent is slowly 
receding into the shadow of Alzheimer's, we feel our 
own impotence before human quandries that cannot be 
resolved by any amount of therapeutic ingenuity. 
(McDaniel, Hepworth & Doherty, 1993, p. 63) 
In fact, the "quest for cure is a dangerous myth that serves 
patient and practitioner poorly. It distracts their attention 
from step-by:--step behaviours that lessen suffering, even if they 
do not magically heal the disease" (Kleinman, 1988b, p. 229). 
Although therapists cannot cure chronic illness, they have 
a vital role to play in helping patients and caregivers with the 
problems created by the disease, such as loss and loneliness. 
162 
Despite this, most people who are faced with chronic 
illness are elderly pensioners, and therefore psychologists 
cannot expect them to be able to afford individual psychotherapy. 
Thus, if psychologists offer their services to community-based 
organizations, such as Stroke Aid or ARDA, they could make a 
significant difference to the care provided by these 
organizations. In addition, therapists in training could 
practice their skills and gain valuable experience of group 
therapy should they become involved in such organizations. This 
would in turn, help those organizations that depend on volunteers 
for help. 
However, according to McDaniel, Hepworth and Doherty ( 19 9 3 ) , 
therapists who have worked with those experiencing chronic 
·illness, have tended to regard medical problems as secondary to 
the 'real' issues of interpersonal interaction. Family therapy 
theories can therefore actually block an adequate understanding 
of a client's real dilemma. Rather than therapists ignoring the 
impact of the illness on people's lives, McDaniel, Hepworth and 
Doherty (1993) define the therapist's role in the area of chronic 
illness, as follows: 
The job of the medical family therapist is more to 
bear witness than to intervene, to listen and 
encourage families to tell their own stories, find 
their own meanings in the calamity that has forever 
altered them. Not that this is so very different from 
what all family therapists do, but the stakes are 
higher. Illness and death, as perhaps nothing else, 
take us to the very edge of human extremity. (p. 63) 
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APPENDIX 
FIRST INTERVIEW - INTRODUCTORY PATTER 
As I mentioned to you on the 'phone, I am interested in 
talking with you about how you've experienced your husband's/ 
wife's illness, because I believe that if health professionals 
have a more in-depth understanding of this they could perhaps be 
more understanding and useful to people, like yourself. I 
haven't got any set questions, because I am interested in your 
way of relating to your husband's/wife's illness. I will also 
not take notes during our discussion, but will rather tape this 
interview so that I don't overlook any important information. 
Once I've talked with other caregivers, I will listen to the tape 
of this interview and only then will I think of a few questions 
which I might have regarding this conversation and will contact 
you to make another appointment for a second interview. When I 
report my findings I will at times quote verbatim from different 
sections of the interviews, but I won't reveal your name at any 
point in the discussion, so you needn't worry about people being 
able to identify that it was you who said a particular thing. 
So, perhaps we could start where you feel most comfortable, 
and go on from there? 
